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Resumo
No actual contexto macroeconómico mundial é essencial a adopção de novas formas de geração
de energia, alternativas à utilização de recursos fósseis, combinada com os objectivos de fiabi-
lidade e qualidade dos fornecimentos e de indução de competitividade nos mercados. Torna-se
necessário produzir, transportar e distribuir energia de forma sustentável sem prejudicar o ecossis-
tema. A visão de uma infraestrutura com maior controlo, onde redes, produtores e consumidores
têm papeis significativamente mais activos, está a provocar uma mudança de paradigma nas redes
eléctricas e na sua gestão que se materializa no conceito das Smart Grids.
Para obter um elevado nível de controlo de operação da rede, necessário para a concretização das
funcionalidades prometidas pelas Smart Grids, a arquitectura terá que evoluir de modo a comportar
um maior número de unidades remotas inteligentes, o desenvolvimento de novos sistemas técnicos
e comerciais, o aumento de trocas de mensagens entre aplicações e a interligações entre diver-
sas redes. Esta complexidade é bastante maior daquela que poderemos encontrar nas actuais
infra-estruturas de sistemas de informação para a transmissão e distribuição de energia eléctrica
e apresenta novos desafios no que diz respeito à disponibilidade da rede e, em particular, à sua
segurança. Os novos equipamentos, aplicações, hardware, protocolos de comunicação, operação
e administração da rede vão introduzir novas potenciais vulnerabilidades que podem ser explora-
das por indivíduos mal intencionados ou simplesmente por erros de operação. Esta preocupação
acerca da disponibilidade e segurança da rede de energia eléctrica do futuro evidenciam a impor-
tância que assumem a segurança e disponibilidade da infra-estrutura dos sistemas de informação
e comunicações que a suportam.
Este trabalho propõem-se analisar a confiabilidade das Smart Grids no que diz respeito aos seus
aspectos de segurança de tecnologias de informação, incidindo em particular no projecto Portu-
guês de Smart Grid denominado InovGrid. Este projecto de investigação irá descrever as funcio-
nalidades da arquitectura InovGrid fazendo uma análise detalhada dos vectores de ataque e os
riscos eminentes associados à sua implementação. Este estudo irá avaliar e propor soluções no
domínio da autenticidade, confidencialidade e não-repudiação de informação numa arquitectura
peculiar e heterogenia com a das Smart Grids.
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Abstract
In the current global macroeconomic context is essential to adopt new ways of generating energy
alternatives to fossil fuels, combined with the objectives of reliability and quality of delivery and
induction of competitiveness in markets. It is necessary to produce, transport and distribute energy
in a sustainable way without harming the ecosystem. The vision of an infrastructure with more
control, where networks, producers and consumers have significantly more active roles, is causing
a paradigm shift in electricity networks and their operations that is embodied in the concept of Smart
Grids.
To obtain a high level of control required to achieve the new features promised by Smart Grids,
the architecture will need to comprise more intelligent remote terminal units, the development of
new technical and commercial systems, the increase of the number of messages exchange bet-
ween applications and also interconnections between enterprise networks. This complexity, far
higher than found in present transmission and distribution infrastructures, will bring several chal-
lenges considering network reliability and security in particular. All the new devices, applications,
hardware, communication protocols, network operations and administration will introduce potential
vulnerabilities that might be explored by malicious users or simple by erroneous actions from a va-
riety of external and internal sources. This concern about security and reliability of the future power
grids increase the importance of the information technology and communications infrastructures
and their security.
This work proposes to analyze Smart Grid’s reliability regarding its information technology security
but focusing the study in the Portuguese Smart Grid project implementation, named as InovGrid.
It will describe the functionalities of the InovGrid architecture providing a detailed analysis of its at-
tack vectors and the eminent risks associated with the implementation. It will propose and analysis
solutions for confidentiality, authenticity and non-repudiation aspects in such peculiar and hetero-
geneous networks.
Keywords: Smart Grid, InovGrid, PKI, Trusted Computing, STRIDE.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Energy is one of the biggest challenges that humanity faces in the future. Societies aim to transform
the current energy system into one which will be more sustainable that does not hurt the environ-
ment and the ecosystems. Efficient transmission and distribution of electricity is a fundamental
requirement for providing societies and economies with essential energy resources. The common
vision that electrical companies are moving toward should meet the needs of the future energy
objectives for sustainability, security and competitiveness. Electrical grids are currently enduring a
new and fundamental evolution, materialized in the vision of the smart grid concept [1]. Smart grid
should be flexible and accessible granting connection access to all network users, particularly for
renewable power sources and high efficiency local generation with zero or low carbon emission.
Nowadays distribution service management and power grid operation are supported by a complex
architecture of actuators, sensors, communications and information systems, assuring extensive
collection and management of real-time data, run-time decision-support and coordinated control.
This constitutes the core of modern supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, as
well as advanced metering infrastructures (AMI), which implement process oriented and integrated
approaches both to grid and to client management, more efficient control paradigms, improve plant
and staff safety, and reduce the cost of operation.
The use of standard hardware and software in SCADA systems combined with improved communi-
cation protocols and interconnectivity to outside networks, both corporate and the internet, allow to
cope with increasing complexity of networks and service and provide high levels of efficiency and
effectiveness in decision support to operation and operations planning. Furthermore, new business
and market drivers promote the deployment of large numbers of AMI related intelligent devices
down to the customer’s premises, with bi-directional wired or wireless communication and capabili-
ties for data collection, storage, concentration and distribution as well as command execution.
Nevertheless all the evolutions in the SCADA systems and related infrastructures the smart grids
will dramatically change the way electrical power networks are managed. The active networks of
the future will efficiently link small and medium scale power sources enabling efficient decisions on
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how to best operate the network. The level of control required to achieve such operations are far
higher than found in present transmission and distribution systems as so the number of intelligent
remote terminal units spreading over the entire network. Smart Grids will enforce the need for
systems to communicate among themselves also to satisfy new functionalities and services to
customers, increasing this way the importance of the information technology and communications
infrastructures.
While information technologies are essential to achieve the benefits of smart grid for the customers
and society, they also introduce more complexity, new interdependencies and vulnerabilities that
could be explored by malicious individuals or simple by misuse of information systems [2]. Ap-
proaches to secure these new critical infrastructures must be designed and implemented early in
order to assure the grid reliability and resilience in the context of increased number of sensors,
decentralized processing and holistic enterprise data management.
1.2 Contribution
This research project is part of the major efforts that we are assisting today to provide security
for new cyber infrastructures that will support the context of the new generation of power grids.
This thesis provides an analysis of the potential problems and security requirements regarding
generic architecture for smart grids but will focus the study in the Portuguese case of smart grid
implementation project, leaded by EDP, henceforth identified as InovGrid.
Therefore this work will analyze the InovGrid architecture identifying potential attack vectors and
provides an overall risk analysis for the current project implementation. Latter will focus the study in
specific security problems of the smart grid related with integrity, authentication and non-repudiation
of commercial and technical information through the network.
1.3 Document Organization
The document is organized to give a structured approach and frame for the specific problem in the
context of the smart grids environment. We believe that the structure adopted will give a better
understanding for the contribution of this work to the overall picture of the smart grids. In Chap-
ter 2 is presented a general overview of the smart grid concepts and challenges that includes
the risks associated to this new paradigm, the security requirements for these new infrastructures
and cryptography and key management issues. In Chapter 3 we introduce the Portuguese smart
grid implementation, named as InovGrid project, describing the overall architecture and also the
functional requirements. In Chapter 4 we make a security analysis, identifying the attack vectors
for specific vulnerabilities and we present some risk awareness considerations. In Chapter 5 we
present a security architecture for the InovGrid to mitigate all the security vulnerabilities identified in
chapter 4. Finally in Chapter 6 we draw some conclusions and point some venues for future work.
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Chapter 2
Smart Grids Security Challenges
This Chapter give an overview of the smart grid concept, presenting high level actors and interac-
tions. It will enumerate all the principles behind smart grid philosophy, focusing in the networking
reliability and information security. It also explain the security strategy that should guide the im-
plementation of those networks in order to provide reliability. Furthermore we describe security
requirements to enforce the security strategy as also the issues concerning with their implementa-
tion in such grid’s architecture.
2.1 Smart Grid Concept
Smart grid is envisioned to transform the current power transport and distribution network to one
more intelligent, with a high level of control and more efficient operations. To fulfill these goals
the smart grid will take advantage of all available technologies from applications and hardware
components to communication protocols and network sensors. In detail a smart grid will facilitate
the following seven principles [3]:
• more autonomous control of the network in order to facilitate resiliency against component
failures and natural disasters usually identified as self-healing capabilities;
• pursuing the global energy sustainability objective since smart grid will comprise renewable
resources like wind and solar energy, either from consumers to power plants;
• two-way communication between the consumer and utility. In the new smart grid paradigm
consumers can have an active role as they can tailor their energy consumption based on
preferences and information that they could access (price, profile consume, etc.). They also
can play the role of micro producers selling energy to the network operators;
• improved market efficiency by creating new services and functionalities made available to
consumers and other market participants;
• optimizing assets and provide efficiency in operations;
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• higher quality of service for the 21st century needs (free of voltage sags and spikes as well
as other disturbances and interruptions).
• improve infrastructure resiliency against malicious attacks and misuse operations from inter-
nal and external sources through better cybersecurity and physical security mechanisms.
The following figure depicts the overall picture of smart grid’s actors and interactions. This picture
identifies seven domains where each needs to transmit, store, edit and process information.
Figure 2.1: Smart Grid overall picture. Source: NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid
Interoperability Standards, Release 1.0 (NIST SP 1108).
In the picture above actors are systems, devices or programs that make decisions and exchange
information necessary for executing applications within the smart grid and the continuous lines
represent the interconnections between those actor’s domains that would be implemented in a
myriad of different communication’s technologies.
Smart grid will introduce thousands of new components to the electric infrastructure but it also
comprises different systems and applications with different proposes and requirements. Many of
those components, systems and applications are critical to interoperability and reliability of the
network and they will need to communicate bidirectional maintaining confidentiality, integrity, and
availability.
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2.2 Smart Grid Security Risks and Strategy
Security in the context of the smart grids should cover all the issues involving the automation and
communications that affect the operation of the network as also all the business processes that
support the service being delivered to customers. Saying that it means we are considering all the
systems and applications that enables all the automation processes as also organization proce-
dures like assets inventory, patch updates or firewall management. Currently, critycal infrastruc-
ture’s operators also have wide spread concerns regarding security however smart grids brings
brand new risks and vulnerabilities [4] to operations especialy due to the following situations:
• The amount of data being managed will be much more than we handle in today’s critical
infrastructures. There are some approaches that even consider the use of the cloud to provide
storage space [5]. This fact leverage data privacy problems since great part of the collected
information will be related with customers.
• Smart grids will increase the complexity of information system’s architectures, leading to more
vulnerable points and leveraging the possibility of failures resulting from bad operations.
• Since the number of intelligent sensors, systems, applications and even third parties involved
in network operations will increase dramatically, we will have a large number of stakeholders
which will be difficult to control when comes to ensuring security requirements in the services
they provide, whenever these are applications development or communications infrastruc-
tures.
• Since the architecture spreads from the customer home to the biggest electrical power pro-
ducers, assuming a big geographic dispersion, we will have to consider different communi-
cations techniques and protocols, sometimes solutions compromised by local conditions like
poor terminal equipments with limited possibilities to implement security mechanisms.
• Increasing vulnerabilities resulting from the increase number of softwares and firmwares.
• The number of physical installations that will maintain equipments connected to the commu-
nication network will also increase, which means that the network access control will also be
more difficult to implement.
• The use of new technologies can introduce new vulnerabilities which is common before the
technologies become mature.
• Interconnected networks will also be a reality which also leads to more common vulnerabili-
ties. As an example we can have network interconnections inside the same company, since
the new functionalities leveraged by smart grids will force more interactions between commer-
cial and technical systems that, most of times, are at separated networks.
• The systems that controls critical infrastructures have real time requirements that could be
jeopardized in such complex architecture like the ones brought by smart grids.
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Smart grid security strategy should address prevention, detection, response and recovery based
on a defense-in-depth approach [6]. It means that the security should be implemented in all archi-
tecture layers with one or more security mechanism at each layer since no single security measure
can counter all type of threats. This way the risk of one component being compromised is mitigated
with additional security mechanisms. As an example we might have a system comprising intrusion
detection systems (IDS), firewalls, incident response operation and antivirus. Saying that the stra-
tegy should address prevention, detection, response and recovery means that security should be
planned from the design phase, for instance at application’s design and development, to infrastruc-
ture operations, by implementing a security operation center with incident response capabilities,
through recovery using intrusion tolerant architectures [7] or detection provided by intrusion detec-
tion systems.
In cyber security strategy for smart grids is also important to assume that the logical security archi-
tecture should be an iterative process that should revising the architecture to address new threats,
vulnerabilities, and technologies and that all systems will be targets for an attack or misuse. It is
also necessary to balance the impact of a security breach and the resources required to implement
mitigating security measures since some of the solutions might jeopardize the system functiona-
lities and related services or simple too expensive to be implemented. Nevertheless, and since
each smart grid implementation will be a different case, we should identify the high level security
requirements.
2.3 Smart Grids Security Requirements
This section intent to identify and describe the challenges to implement typical high level security
requirements for a typical smart grid architecture. These security requirements are accepted to
be essential to adopt a depth defense strategy for a smart grid implementation and are selected
considering the security constrains of the power systems operations that imposes strictly require-
ments for systems availability and resilience. In practice it means that, when in presence of a cyber
attack, the systems should, ideally, resist without affecting the operation or, at least, recovery fast
and gracefully.
In last years IT security has become a major concern in the organizations and we have witnessed
the development of many cyber security solutions to protect IT corporate networks and to reduce
their vulnerability to cyber attacks. It is common in corporate networks to have security mechanisms
that goes from firewalls to intrusion detection systems, through virtual private networks. This type of
solutions have proven to be quite effective in securing corporate IT infrastructures, however critical
infrastructures impose different requirements [8] and consequently different solutions that we may
resume as:
• In corporate networks main concerns are about protecting data integrity, confidentiality and
availability. In power grid it is also important to maintain these security properties however the
main motivation is to protect human’s safety, normal network operations, network equipment
and power lines.
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• In corporate networks the architecture is more centralized because data resides at central
servers where is required more protection than the edge nodes which are used by end users,
whereas in critical infrastructures we have intelligent remote devices at the edges that controls
electrical power equipments like circuit breaker or re-closers. The incorrect operation of these
devices can do harm to human life or affect the service provided to the customers. Therefore,
in power grid networks, most notably in smart grids, the edge nodes need the same level of
protection as central devices.
• Operating systems and communications also differ from corporate networks to electrical po-
wer critical information infrastructures. In the former we find Windows, Unix and Linux as
operating systems and Ethernet is used to connect all devices with IP-based protocols. In
critical information infrastructures we also find in field devices vendor proprietary operating
systems and many different communications protocols (e.g. IEC61850 [9], DNP 3.0 [10]).
Therefore, common security solutions designed for corporate networks might be ineffective
for critical information infrastructures.
• In corporate networks some practices to solve problems in case of failure might pass from
rebooting a machine or application and also the delay in communications are allowed since,
besides systems that support online market transactions, most applications are not real time,
whereas in critical information infrastructures these behaviors or properties are not accep-
table.
The requirements described in next sections are equivalent to others presented in well known fra-
meworks like ISO 27002 [11], however the intention for the current work is to enhance the issues
regarding their implementation in smart grid’s context. Therefore, while describing the require-
ments, we do not intent to provide technical solutions or technologies for their implementation and
some might apply to specific architecture elements or all components, while others are strictly pro-
cedural or organizational. The requirements should be implemented in the field regarding a specific
security strategy in each smart grid implementation case, which should led to the right choice of
technical solutions and technologies.
2.3.1 Access Control
Access control is a big challenge in smart grids security due to the myriad of different components,
systems, stakeholders and locations. A well defined access control should start by defining access
control policies to grant the right resources are accessed only by the appropriate individuals. Ac-
cess control comprises network access, wireless access, remote access, mobile devices access
and account management. The philosophy beyond the security access policy should be based on
separation of duties and least privilege rationale [12].
However access control in not only to define policies but also about to monitor access activities and
react properly against policies violations. It means that when choosing the solutions and technolo-
gies to implement the access control strategy it should be take in consideration notifications, logs
and auditabable information.
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2.3.2 Identification and Authentication
Before a person, device or a process gets the right to access the appropriate resources his identity
must be correctly verified. In the smart grid environment this represents a big endeavor because
there are a large number of devices and user (or processes behind users) that connects to the
infrastructure. Providing mechanisms and processes to confirm the identity of users and devices in
such big and heterogeneous architecture is not simple and the task must start by defining policies
and procedures addressing roles, responsibilities, scope and guidelines for identity mechanisms
implementation.
Practical considerations about identity security mechanisms implementation allow us to identify
in advance specific issues like establishing the procedures for initial credential distribution or the
mechanisms to handle with credential lost, damage or revocation, in a network with so many actors,
technologies and equipments. Even from the organization point of view, the simple situation like the
report of a credential lost from some stakeholder, requires a well defined process in order to avoid
situations where someone could stole identity information and use it in a malicious way before the
organization could react.
2.3.3 Audit and Accountability
Audit and accountability plays an important role of the smart grid overall security. Audit will basically
work over the system and device logs in order to facilitate anomaly detection and forensic analysis.
Here, as in other security requirements, the problem in smart grids is caused by the heterogeneity
and dimension of the architecture, where some devices will have few possibilities to store, protect
and produce enough detailed log information while others are designed to send logs over the net-
work to a central device, causing impact in the network performance in the situation when we have
low bandwidth communication links.
Despite problems with devices and communications logging handling capabilities there are fun-
damental challenges in log management [13] that are enhanced by the smart grid’s specificities.
Those challenges might be divided in the following categories:
• Regarding log generation and storage the problems arise from the fact that:
1. Many log sources. In smart grids the problem of many log sources becomes even worse
than in normal corporate networks. There are different communication technologies that
can trigger different events as also a myriad of servers and equipments (for example
millions of advanced meters in the customer’s houses) that can generate multiple logs.
2. Inconsistent log content is also an issue, because each log source records certain
events in the log entries and, sometimes, is difficult to link events recorded by different
sources because they might do not have any common values registered. In smart grids
the problem is more dramatically since, for instance, we might have different types of net-
work addressing in different smart grid’s areas and the equipments in each network will
store information considered important but that might be hard to relate (as an example
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we might have proprietary protocols communications in the electrical power substations
and power line carrier to reach the advanced meters at the customer’s houses).
3. Logs timestamps are a huge challenge in the smart grid environment. In order to make
logs meaningful when analyzing events, they must store information consistent times-
tamps. Usually equipments generate logs with reference to their internal clocks, which
might become a problem in such vast architecture as the smart grid. For example it is a
challenge to have a billing system in the datacenter recording events with the same time
accuracy as the advanced metering in costumer home. Maintaining clock synchroniza-
tion [14] in order to perform coherent timestamp in the smart grid component’s logs it is
a significative endeavor.
4. Log Format Inconsistency. Regarding the inconsistency log format is also important to
emphasize that all those different equipments will produce different logs formats, some
stored in databases, others in text files, like comma-separated files, or even in binary
format. Also some logs have formats to be read by humans while others not, and some
are to be stored locally while others are to be transmitted in the network. In Smart Grids,
due heterogeneity, it will be hard to adopt a common method and a way to uniform the
log format.
• Apart from the problems regarding logs storage and generation other challenge resulting
from the log management is the log protection. Because logs contain information about sys-
tem and network security, they need to be protected from malicious actions that threaten their
confidentiality, availability and integrity. Logs can be intentionally or unintentionally changed
and destroyed which enables malicious activities to go unnoticed and manipulation events
to conceal the identity of an attacker. Still regarding the log protection is also important to
address the log retention period. In order to analyze a situation related with some suspicious
activity occurred in the past it is necessary that, all equipments that support the process
store information with reference to a specific point in time. So it is necessary to adopt a
consistent log retention period across all the architecture that satisfies, at least, legal requi-
rements which, in the smart grid context, it will be hard to do due to the different equipments
capabilities.
• Finally, the log analysis also presents a significative challenge because if, in well known infor-
mation systems environments the logging monitoring is hard to implement, in smart grids it
will be even more difficult because it requires handling logs from different geographic locations
and equipments, not to mention the huge amount of events that will be produced.
In resume this high-level requirement presents big challenges in a smart grid environment. There
are however a few key practices [15] that should guide the logging managing in order to address the
problems mentioned before. The organizations should start to define and prioritize its requirements
for performing logging to include applicable laws, regulations, and organizational policies. Then it
should establish policies and procedures for log management and create and maintain a secure
log management infrastructure. Finally organizations should ensure necessary training to staff
regarding log management responsibilities and also includes, in information systems acquisition
and development processes, the logs requirements established by the organization.
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2.3.4 Configuration Management
Configuration changes to the smart grid infrastructure needs to be safeguarded by the organiza-
tion. For a number of different reasons there is the possibility that some equipments might need
to change their configurations. It is not hard to imagine that some devices might need to upgrade
firmware, to couple with new functionalities, or applications could be patched to fix some detected
problem. All those configurations changes, whenever are to fix errors or support new functionali-
ties, could introduce new vulnerabilities in the infrastructure that could be intentionally explored by
malicious individuals.
It is important to define and document a configuration baseline for the smart grid information sys-
tems and equipments. More than define and document a baseline is also indispensable to adopt a
change management process to manage all configuration changes. This process must ensure that
only approved and tested changes are applied to the smart grid’s infrastructure driving to a baseline
update. Moreover, to correctly monitor and log all the configuration changes in the all systems it is
also indispensable to have a rigorous component inventory of the entire infrastructure. Satisfying
such security requirement in smart grid’s infrastructure is a big challenge that needs to be correctly
addressed.
2.3.5 Physical and Environmental Security
Physical and environmental security, although not directly related with information security, as-
sumes a special importance in the context of smart grids. Considering that most equipments will
be installed at thousands of locations, sometimes exposed in adverse environments, is essential not
only to provide the devices with capabilities to resist external environment threats, like temperature
or dust, but also with adequate physical protections to avoid an attacker to tamper devices.
Furthermore it is essential to use surveillance in critical installations, like substations, and register
all the personal accesses to the buildings. The physical accesses to the equipments should be de-
fined and controlled and the devices should trigger alarms when are being tampered. For instance
the intelligent meters installed at customer’s homes should implement a break the seal mechanism
and raise an alarm when it is broken. Physical and environment security in smart grids is a huge
endeavor and will impose serious restrictions and costs to device’s manufacturers.
2.3.6 Security Incident Management
In the event of disruption of normal smart grid information system operation is necessary to continue
or resume the correct operation of the information systems. The operations disruption might result
from natural disasters, by human misuse or by malicious actions (e.g. terrorist acts) and, when
detected, the organization should have clear procedures and processes in order to resume or
continue the information systems operation. It follows that in the smart grids wide environment it
will be more difficult to establish those procedures and processes because it will involve different
teams and third parties dispersed over geographic locations. It is also more challenging to settle
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preparation, training and maintenance activities for the incident management procedures due to
similar reasons.
Most incident response teams’ bases their activities in intelligent monitor systems often called SIEM
(Security Incident and Event Management) [16]. These systems usually comprises an appliance
with a software capable to collect logs and events information from a variety of sources, like firewalls
or intrusion detection systems, and correlate all information according to specific configurations,
that should reflect the organization’s security policies, and raise alarms for an operator console.
Under the presence of a security incident alarm, the security incident management process should
guide teams to take control and act in order to continue or resume the information systems ope-
ration. In smart grids the information will be collected from a huge number of equipments, thus
setting a monitor console is not simple and demands some strategy and risk awareness. The type
of events and also the components selection to provide events to the SIEM must be wisely chosen
but, most important is to establish intelligent rules to perform the correlation and analysis in order
to detect security incidents.
2.3.7 Information Systems Acquisition, Development and Maintenance
As often mentioned in this work, gmart grids will comprise a large number of applications, different
systems, firmware and components as also users, services and third parties. Ensuring that secu-
rity requirements will be presented in all components of the architecture is not so easy as the case
of typical corporate networks. Here we are dealing with many closed products from several ven-
dors that have different philosophies considering product or software development and also some
services acquisition that could introduce malicious individuals into operations. The challenge with
this security requirement is to ensure, in such heterogeneous environment, the integration of the
security policy controls when acquiring a new service or system, or when developing or maintaining
an application. Therefore is necessary a detailed procedure with precise and defined controls in
order to minimize the chances of introducing new vulnerabilities in the acquisitions or developing
process.
2.4 Cryptography and Key Management
This section addresses the challenges to implement cryptography and key management at smart
grid’s infrastructures. Cryptography and key management are the means to ensure confidentiality,
authentication and integrity of the information across the infrastructure. In smart grids environment,
cryptography and key management presents big challenges due the size, scale and heterogeneous
architecture. In practice well known cryptography techniques needs to be adapted to face some
smart grid constraints.
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2.4.1 Computational Issues
The major limitation is related with computational constraints and results from the fact that in power
grid most of the devices were purpose-built and do not have extra capacity to perform security
functions. In case of some devices, like the intelligent meters in customer’s houses, the device also
needs to be very cost effective because millions will be purchased. They have many requirements
essentially unrelated to security, such as storing meter readings or interfacing to many different
network technologies, therefore, providing additional storage for audit logs and key material, or
adding compute power for encryption/decryption, can increase the cost of the devices. Moreover
it is also important to notice that the lifespan of devices in the electrical power systems is much
longer than in the current corporate IT system equipments’ like a desktop computer. Devices like
intelligent meters might have 15 or 20 years replacement cycle [4] which means that the security
designed and implemented now will last for this period of time.
An intelligent meter, or other power system device, should be protected from a break-once break-
everywhere scenario which might happen if we adopt one secret key or a common credential in the
entire infrastructure. This way each device should have unique credentials or key material in case
of the compromise of one device does not impact other components. The keys must also have
appropriate lifecycles of periodic rekeying and revocation.
2.4.2 Communications Issues
Other strong constraint in adapting cryptographic solutions to smart grids comes from communi-
cations issues. We must have present that smart grids will comprise a variety of channels with
different bandwidths and protocols, therefore if we want to implement a message authentication
code in a slow channel, even with a low overhead that could be for instance 64 or 96 bits, it can
turn into a problem for network operation reliability. Channel bandwidth constraints also impacts
certificate solutions selection since some of them have heavy protocols that exchange multiple
messages before arrive to a shared key, which might be too costly, even considering small size
certificates. The message encryption itself does not impact in the bandwidth because the message
size is roughly the same, however it will impact some low levels network compression mechanisms,
since the encryption will uniformly randomize the data, thus reducing the compression efficiency
[12].
2.4.3 General Issues
Besides the general computational and communication constraints mentioned above, we might
find other issues related with cryptography that impact solutions to be adopted. An example is
that devices might not have access to good sources of entropy which is fundamental for good
randomness in cryptographic operations like key generation [17]. Regarding keys management
usually we can opt to provide secret keys shared between entities or digital public keys certificates
for key establishment. In the former case the provisioning of secret keys can be a very expensive
process with security vulnerabilities, due to the fact the secret keys needs to be transported from
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the devices where they were generated to at least another device, since we must adopt different
keys for each pair of communication devices. The process to provision devices with secret keys in
such size and scale architecture will be prone to errors that will introduce vulnerabilities and also
might become cost prohibitive. On the other hand public keys infrastructures also have its issues
that are enhanced in the context of smart grids [18]. Certifications revocation or validation demands
connectivity to servers which can be difficult to maintain in such complex architecture, thus we have
high-availability problems. Also the trust management represents a problem since some public
key infrastructure implementations require one root certification authority trusted by everyone and
cross signed certificates might be necessary when organizations need to interoperate, thus trust
management is far to be a trivial issues in smart grid context.
13
Chapter 3
InovGrid Project
This chapter will focuses in the Portuguese smart grid project implementation identified as Inov-
Grid [19]. It will provide an architecture overview and also a description of the project functional
requirements which are essential to understand before doing the security analysis.
3.1 Architecture Description
This section presents a high level architecture overview of InovGrid, including the main architec-
ture components and their interfaces. The following picture shows a high level diagram where we
can identify all the actors starting from the hierarchy top-level components, where we can find se-
veral types of applications, through different kind of communications infrastructures, systems and
devices, ending at the customer’s homes. All those components communicate among each other
providing logical interfaces to transmit information that could be, for instance, meter values or device
commands.
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Figure 3.1: InovGrid Global Architecture
The information systems (IS) are at the top of hierarchy and their function is to manage all the
infrastructure information, collecting and processing all the data but also sending commands and
configurations downstream through the network.
The distribution transformer controller (DTC) purpose is to aggregate all the information from the
downstream energy boxes and send it to upstream information systems and also permit communi-
cations from the upstream systems to the energy boxes. The DTC is installed at switch substations
(also called secondary substations) and includes modules for measuring, actuation, processing,
interface and communication.
The energy box (EB) is installed at each costumer’s home and includes modules for measuring,
actuation, processing, interface and communication. It receives commands and configurations from
upstream and send power meter consumption and production figures for upstream architecture
components, like the DTC and IS.
These architecture layers are connected by communications technologies and protocols. The net-
work that connects the customer, either a consumer or producer, to his EB is called the home area
network (HAN). The network that connects the EB to DTC layer is the local area network (LAN).
The wide area network (WAN) is the network that connects DTC to IS layer.
3.1.1 Information Systems
The large volume of information generated in the InovGrid infrastructure will be centrally managed
by a group of information systems that shall interact with other systems and equipments installed
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in distribution grid.
These InovGrid information systems must implement commercial and operational requirements
described latter in this document, however, to give an idea of their importance, we highlight the
following features for the information systems architecture layer:
• It should manage information of commercial/rate-related nature, required to bill the use of the
grid for each consumer or independent producer. It should also manage the fraud control,
which involves the consumption monitoring, energy production, quality of service or compen-
sations.
• It should manage the consumption/production related information in order to support the ser-
vices as part of the electricity market, which includes obligations like sending information to
marketers, to systems operator or regulatory authority. It should also manage the energy data
to enable the calculus of energy balances, technical and commercial losses and determining
typical consumption profiles.
• Must consider the infrastructure’s technical management needs as also the rules for the elec-
tricity market and manage the quality of data collected by validating, editing and estimating
its values.
• Implement operations associated with consumption/production contractual life cycle, including
rate changes, cut-off and service restoring, changes in contract power and contract activa-
tion/termination.
• It shall actuate on EB devices for temporal limitation of available power, as part of operations
related with managing the distribution grid.
• It should manage and control the public lighting.
• It shall manage technical information necessary to monitor, control and operate the distribu-
tion grid, interacting with SCADA/DMS [20] or others equivalents, and support the systems
responsible for managing incidents.
• It should update the configuration, manage events and performance of technical assets that
are part of the InovGrid infrastructure, like the DTC and EB.
The systems responsible for grid management may communicate directly with the various DTCs or
via this layer of information systems, depending whenever there are constrains related with security,
real time monitoring and control functions or technical nature, among others.
The information systems also have the goal to provide the marketers with information to enable
them to manage the services to their customers. It means that we have third parties accessing
information from the network through this layer of systems which implies that access to information
should consider various access levels, making use of authentication mechanisms.
Escalation and modularity are strong design requirement for information systems development be-
cause they should be able to support, without affecting the functionalities already working, new
features that could derived from the EBs or DTCs, or new services requirements to manage energy
related data.
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3.1.2 Distribution Transformer Controller
The DTC purpose is to aggregate all the information from the downstream EBs, installed at the
customer’s homes, and send it to upstream information systems. It also permits communications
from the upstream systems to EBs, specifically to exchange information and software or firmware
remote updates.
The DTC is a local control equipment to be installed at switching substations and should include
modules for measuring, actuation, processing, interface and communication. Sometimes we might
found DTCs at substations, everytime that the switching substations could not support such equip-
ment.
Each electrical power transformer, installed at a switch substation, will have an associated DTC that
controls environment and electrical variables like voltages or environment temperature. Moreover
it can perform actuation in transformer’s switch or turn on and off the public lighting.
The modules that comprise the DTC are.
• CPU is the central processor unit which needs to have the computational power to perform all
the DTC functions.
• Power supply unit.
• HMI is the module responsible for the interface with the user (local access).
• I/O AC are analog inputs for monitoring of electrical currents and voltages.
• I/O DC are analog inputs for temperature monitorization.
• I/O Digital e IO Digital Ex are digital inputs and output for monitorization and actuation.
• LAN communication module represents the connection between the DTC downstream to
energy boxes.
• WAN communication module represents the connection between the DTC upstream to
information systems.
The DTC also supports a serial port RS-232 for communication with public lightingh meter, one
interface ethernet and other bluetooth to interface with local user.
Every DTC should support, at least, 1000 downstream energy boxes, however, for this project, it
connects, on average, about 200 nodes.
3.1.3 Energy Box
One of the most important components of the InovGrid’s architecture is the energy box. This
device will be installed at consumers/producers premises (including all modules for measuring,
actuation, processing, interface or communication, among others), so is easy to infer there will be
a large number of EBs spread by millions location points, some physical accessible to potential
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malicious individuals. This component requires strong security measures since a vulnerability in
the architecture could immediately be explored in every installed EB.
The EB is a key element not only due to the large number they represent in the architecture but
also because the functionalities implemented in the context of the modern power grids, together
with the fact that is expected a large live cycle for such equipments. Therefore the EB will require
an evolutionary architecture in order to couple with new functionalities combined with an acceptable
production cost. It should respect the following requirements:
• Modularity in a sense that should make possible to quickly and easily configure the most
suitable solutions at the best price for consumers;
• Evolutionary, it should couple with services and functionalities evolution without the need to
replace the installed equipment. For instance, it should be possibility of setting up value-
added services for more demanding customers by simply including additional modules on top
of standard core;
• It should operate similarly to “computer-peripherals,” enabling to externally connect or plug
other devices to expand the services (e.g. possibility of connecting to more advanced/complex
displays).
Additionally we need to consider the following:
• Ability to connect to other external components (advanced display, PDAs/laptops/PCs other
meters).
• Ability to have a basic configuration with other minimum services that are indispensable to
any device to be set up at the consumption site, taking into account the basic processing and
the memory of the central module, namely:
Metrology (active and reactive power and energy);
Standard data processing for the purposes of preparing rates, load diagrams, alarms,
events, managing cut-off/restoring orders and change of power, among others;
• Communication with the DTC;
• Standard interface for communication with external devices;
• Power cut-off/connecting mechanisms and control of maximum power;
• Display with basic control and safety information;
• It should have the ability to include and integrate other software modules without the need to
replace the equipment, so as to bring about an evolution of services being offered, including:
Additional processing capability (calculations, statistics, profiles, rates);
Home area network communication for interaction with other devices, such as displays,
equipment controllers (domotics), sensors and actuators, other meters (e.g. PLC connec-
tion [21], ZigBee [22], Wi-Fi [23]);
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Micro-production support, with energy management and production control capability;
Ability to integrate a demand side management module;
Figure 3.2: Energy Box Architecture
The EB architecture in Figure 3.2 illustrates the modularity and evolutionary capacity features.
There are two modules of the EB that deserves further description.
3.1.3.1 Communications Module
The communication module will be responsible for transmission of the information contained in the
control and metering module of energy box, either upstream via LAN / WAN network or downstream
to the HAN. The data bus to connect the control and metering module with the communications
module will be based on interface RS232/Multidrop [24] running on top of it the protocol DLMS [25].
The data bus that makes the interconnection of communication module with other modules of the
energy box uses the communication interface EIA 485 [26] and the Modbus [27] RTU communica-
tion protocol. This communication bus shall enable a troughtput greater or equal than 9600 Kbps.
The ModBUS is an open standard protocol and has been used in several areas and applications.
It can run on top of EIA 232, EIA 485 or Ethernet physical environments. The ModBus has some
variants such as MODBUS RTU (the data is sent in binary format, allowing for compression of data
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into small packets), Modbus ASCII (the data is sent in the form of characters, consuming more
network resources and allowing the message legible), Modbus / TCP (data is encapsulated in TCP
frames in binary format).The solution adopted in the current version of the InovGrid is the MODBUS
RTU.
The communications module allow remote reading of the records of EB (e.g. consumption, power
consumption profile, historical events, quality of service, the measurement point / delivery), as well
as changing the configuration parameters (e.g. change of tariff periods, changes in legal time or
setting time) and information on the LAN (e.g. network next hop). It also permits changing any
password to access the services and update the firmware.
3.1.3.2 Metering Module
The metering and control module consists of an energy meter, single or three phases, connected to
the low voltage network, with capacity at least for measuring active and reactive energy consumed
and produced. It also includes sufficient storage capacity to retain information values for active and
reactive energy consumed and produced, during configurable periods, and to support firmware and
software updates.
For the purpose of supporting the low voltage network technical management, the metering and
control module, in addition to the limitation of the contracted power, will also have the capability to
signal the power limiting module of a technical nature temporary power interruption. For metering
and billing activities monitoring purpose the metering module will have a real time clock / calendar,
whose accuracy shall be better than 5ppm, synchronized with a similar device existing in the DTC.
3.1.4 Home Area Network
In the functional architecture hierarchy the HAN is the lower layer network connecting the existing
devices at the home of each customer to the EB (e.g. allowing interaction with LCD remote actua-
tors, partial load shedding devices or home automation). Given the operational cost of installing
these devices, usually are considered technologies that do not require the installation of cables, like
wireless technologies. An equipment located at each house enables interaction with other meters
(e.g. micro-generation, gas and water), with local displays, sensors and actuators (e.g. allowing
the selective cutting of loads). However for this work we consider only the interaction with the user,
electrical operator staff and equipment.
3.1.5 Local Area Network
The next communication layer in the architecture is the LAN (Local Area Network), this network
connects the DTC, placed at switch substations, with EBs installed at the home of every consumer.
Each LAN can connect up to a maximum of 1000 devices (on average a LAN will have about 200
nodes on the network), placed along the low voltage network downstream of a switch substation.
This network will permit the parameterization of the meters, the reprogramming of the firmware,
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changing the contracted power, full or selective cutting and sending loads of meter data, both
periodically as on request. Given the possible limitations of the available bandwidth, the network
will allow the definition of priority levels so that the information most urgent are not blocked by less
urgent. The technology for this network is the Yitran power line communication [28] technology.
3.1.6 Wide Area Network
This network connects the DTC to information systems (technical management, energy mana-
gement and metering). The WAN will link approximately 60,000 devices providing bi-directional
communications. These DTCs are installed in places geographically dispersed where the cable
or fiber communication means to their locations, most of the times, are poor on inexistent, which
means that wireless technologies should be adopted. The technology adopted for the current pro-
ject implementation is GPRS [29].
3.2 InovGrid Functional Requirements
In this section we describe the InovGrid funtional requirements relevant for the study presented
in this work. These requirements will enable the security analysis done in latter section, so it is
essencial their description at this phase for a full compreension of this work.
3.2.1 Information Systems Requirements
Now from table 3.1 through table 3.7 we start to describe all the requirements regarding the infor-
mation systems.
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Req Description
RIS-01 The Information System shall comprise a module for dealing with
the acquired information (consumption and production of active
and reactive electricity):
Accumulated consumption/production figures, both aggregate and
by rate;
• Daily accumulated figures, memorized at 00:00, with a
breakdown by rate (daily billing data), upon request;
• Monthly accumulated figures, memorized at 00:00 on the set
billing day, with a breakdown by rate (monthly billing data);
• Maximum power figures during the current billing period or
during previous billing periods, with an associated time/date;
• Load diagrams, upon request, for individual facilities or
sets of facilities, based on criteria, such as: association
with a certain DTC/DSS (Distribution Transformer Control-
ler/Distribution Switch Substation), geographical area, cus-
tomer profile, contract options, among others;
• The type of information to be collected from DTC/EB (Distri-
bution Transformer Controller/Energy Box) should be confi-
gurable, preferably through the use of typical profiles, to be
applied to sets of facilities.
Table 3.1: Power Meter Requirements
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Req Description
RIS-02 The Information System should safeguard the information referred
to under RSI-01 for a configurable period (at least 3 years).
RIS-03 The information pertaining to consumption and production of each
customer should be stored in raw for a given configurable period.
RIS-04 The Information System should store the information pertaining to
quality of service for at least 3 years, in a raw state of acquisition
and in a statistically treated version in the remaining period.
A functionality for validating data pertaining to quality of service,
namely those data regarding power outages, should be provided.
Among the validations to be implemented, we point out: compa-
ring outages recorded in the EBs with those in the corresponding
DTCs; signaling situations where the record results from schedu-
led, maintenance and commercial interventions; comparing with
the information in the incident management system.
RIS-05 The Information System should store the information pertaining to
alarm-related events from devices (DTC and EB), for a period of at
least 3 years, in response to the requisites of fraud management.
RIS-06 All data pertaining to consumption, production and availability for
the market shall always be stored in an online consultation system,
for a period of time never less than 3 years, and the Information
System shall contain a module for consulting such information.
RIS-07 All consumption, production data as well as data for availability for
the market shall always be stored in a backup system (DAT, DVD
or other), for a period of time never less than 3 years. The Infor-
mation System shall contain a module for requests for consulting
such information.
RIS-08 The Information System should store all the information pertaining
to remote configurations, cut-offs / reconnections for a period of at
least 3 years.
Table 3.2: Storage Information Requirements
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Req Description
RIS-09 The Information System shall make possible to change the rate
option of a given customer or sets of customers.
RIS-10 The Information System should make possible to regulate the
contracted power of a given customer or set of customers.
RIS-11 The Information System should make possible to suspend or reac-
tivate power supply to a given customer or set of customers.
RIS-12 The Information System should examine the billing status of each
customer, check available credit in prepaid systems (where appli-
cable) among other issues pertaining to the marketing of electri-
city.
RIS-13 The Information System shall allow for the updating of the firm-
ware of DTC and EB, either individually or in groups to be defined.
RIS-14 The Information System shall perform the initial setup and remo-
tely change all configurations of an EB (including distribution grid
operator and marketer rates, alerts and events to be sent and their
priorities) and of a DTC.
RIS-15 The System shall enable sending tables for controlling public ligh-
ting to the DTC.
Table 3.3: Remote Parameterization Requirements
Req Description
RIS-16 The Information System should allow personalized messages to
be sent to the consumer (notices regarding scheduled
interventions, commercial promotional or energy efficiency
campaigns).
RIS-17 The Information System should provide access to events and
alarms recorded in the system devices (as referred to in the
chapters regarding EB and DTC) and should allow the same to
be processed.
Table 3.4: Interface with the Consumer Requirements
Req Description
RIS-18 The Information System should receive the information regarding
the number and duration of long supply outages for each customer
and supply systems for calculating compensations.
RIS-19 The Information System should receive the information regarding
quality-of-service events, as recorded in each DTC and EB and
should comprise a module for processing this information.
RIS-20 The ability to examine and calculate quality-of-service indicators.
Table 3.5: Quality of Service Requirements
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Req Description
RIS-21 The Information System should include a module for acquiring
the information regarding grid status, customers out of service,
contracted powers, alarms, voltages, active and reactive powers
consumed/injected in junctions in the medium-voltage grid, among
others.
RIS-22 The Information System needs to provide for communication with
SCADA, DMS, ERP systems, among others, through mechanisms
to be defined for this purpose.
RIS-23 Where applicable, the central grid management systems should
receive and treat the telemetry data in terms of the switch sub-
stations installation, namely the status of cut-off equipment and
active and reactive power measurements, voltage in busbars and
other relevant alarms for managing /operating the grid.
RIS-24 Where applicable, the central grid management systems should
be able to include remote control via DTC regarding switch sub-
station’s equipments with remote control capability.
RIS-25 The central technical management system shall receive and deal
with internal data regarding automation functions run by the DTC.
RIS-26 The central technical management system should be able to re-
motely activate / inhibit, on the DTC, a certain type of automation
functions as well as to change configuration parameters.
RIS-27 The central technical management system should include func-
tionalities for managing alarms (e.g. viewing, table lists, filters,
acceptance) regarding the data sent by the DTC and which have
an impact on grid management / operation.
RIS-28 Needs to consider the functionalities needed for public lighting ma-
nagement. It should be possible to configure the timetable and the
way it is sent to the DTC. The DTC shall be directly responsible for
controlling public lighting.
Table 3.6: Technical Management Requirements
Req Description
RIS-29 The Information System should comprise a module for managing
commercial information (e.g. billing data, automatic service or-
ders: cut-off/reconnecting, rate change) through a convenient in-
teraction with its marketer.
Table 3.7: Commercial Management Requirements
3.2.2 Distribution Transformer Controller (DTC) Functional Requirements
The DTC is a device installed at switching substations that aggregates information from downstream
equipments but also permitting communications from upstream devices to lower layers. This device
will comprise a set of requirements described on tables 3.8 through 3.18.
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Req Description
RDTC-01 Measurement, by phase, of active energy flows in both directions
and reactive energy flows broken down in the four quadrants.
RDTC-02 Measurement of the maximum power during a configurable inte-
gration period from 1 to 60 minutes. The maximum power criterion
is based on the following expression: Max[ P(kW)]=Max[E(kWh)/
period(h)]. The recorded figure is reset preferably by default at the
start of each billing period. The grid operator may also perform
this reset either locally or remotely.
RDTC-03 Record of date and time of the period of maximum active power,
by rate type.
RDTC-04 Record of load diagrams of active and reactive power, in the four
quadrants, during configurable integration periods of 15, 30 or 60
minutes.
RDTC-05 Measurement of the consumption of active and reactive energy in
public lighting circuits.
RDTC-06 Record of load diagrams pertaining to public lighting.
Table 3.8: Power Meter Requirements
Req Description
RDTC-07 Figures for consumptions and productions occurring during confi-
gurable integration periods of 15, 30 or 60 minutes for active
energy and reactive energy, both downstream and upstream (for
each power transformer).
RDTC-08 Consumption figures pertaining to public lighting.
The system should store the information required for billing (his-
toric figures - billing data – by rate) relative to the last 6 billing
closures.
Consumption figures occurring during configurable integration
periods of 15, 30 or 60 minutes of active energy.
RDTC-09 The storage of information regarding quality-of-service indexes
(continuity of service and quality of the voltage wave) for a per-
iod of at least 1 year.
RDTC-10 At least the last 256 events should be stored.
RDTC-11 Storage of information from EBs.
The data pertaining to metering (e.g. active energy consumed
and produced, reactive energy in the four quadrants, maximum
power during the billing period, historic figures or events) should
be added and saved in the DTC in file form, indexed to the corres-
ponding EB, for a period of at least 6 months.
Table 3.9: Storage Information Requirements
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Req Description
RDTC-12 Parameterization and remote control of the timetable assigned to
public lighting (for example, configuration of the solar table asso-
ciated with public lighting control).
In applicable situations, we need to consider the functionality of
control (connection/disconnection) on the public lighting circuit
outlet. Connection / disconnection of the circuit from one phase
of the three-phase public lighting circuit, when this is possible.
RDTC-13 Remote change of configuration parameters of distribution trans-
former control functions, such as quality-of-service, power trans-
former load monitoring and environment temperature.
RDTC-14 Control of the public lighting locally, via an available table for such
a purpose, or remotely, through voluntary individual or group ac-
tion.
There should be an offset parameter for the local configurable pu-
blic lighting command order, which will allow the public lighting
connection not to be carried out simultaneously for every distribu-
tion switching substation of a given region.
RDTC-15 Control the transformer’s circuit breaker.
Table 3.10: Remote Commands and Parameterization Requirements
Req Description
RDTC-16 Recording and reporting the number and duration of long (>3min)
and short (<3min) supply outages, with the possibility of being re-
motely parameterized.
RDTC-17 Recording and reporting the typical figures for the quality of the
voltage wave (effective figure, flicker, voltage troughs, harmonics),
by making information available and generating alarm events
when the figures exceed the preset limits and by identifying the
phase and the date of occurrence .
RDTC-18 Recording and reporting typical figures for voltage, current and po-
wer factor by phase, by generating alarm events when the figures
exceed the preset limits and by identifying the phase and the date
of occurrence.
RDTC-19 The system should monitor figures for room and transformer tem-
perature, so as to detect eventual abnormalities at the switching
substation. In the event of abnormality, the DTC should report
such an event to the technical management system.
Table 3.11: Quality of Service Requirements
27
Req Description
RDTC-20 The system should allow for remote updating of the firmware re-
sident in the DTC. This updating needs to be carried out by soft-
ware modules or routines, by making sure the metrology software
is not changed and by enabling greater process swiftness and
sturdiness.
There should be a log associated with updating. Every change
carried out on the equipment should be auditable.
Table 3.12: Firmware Update Requirements
Req Description
RDTC-21 The system needs to be able to identify the hypothetical number
of customers not provided with electricity supply. The DTC sends
a broadcast signal to every EB to request its status. Those EB’s
not responding to the request are considered inactive.
RDTC-22 The system needs to monitor the voltage module value in terms of
the low voltage busbar, by providing valid information to the DMS
system (for example, for voltage control functionalities).
RDTC-23 Alarms regarding overload or imbalance of distribution switching
substation phases need to be generated.
Table 3.13: Technical Management Requirements
Req Description
RDTC-24 The device should make possible to, either remotely or locally,
connect and disconnect the various independent circuits (e.g., dis-
connector, condenser batteries, public lighting).
Control actions may comprise voluntary execution or via automatic
functions included in the distribution transformer controller.
RDTC-25 The device should be able to identify default currents between
phases, as well as between phases and neutral. Such an occur-
rence should be signaled locally and remotely.
Table 3.14: Remote Control, Defect Detection and Automation Requirements
Req Description
RDTC-26 The device should provide a web interface for local or remote ac-
cess to DTC data (parameterization, real-time data, information
records, etc.), subject to protection and security mechanisms du-
ring the encrypting and authentication processes.
Table 3.15: Interface with the User Requirements
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Req Description
RDTC-27 It should be possible to record and store events in non-volatile
memory (appropriate for the DTC and inherent to the EBs).
Recorded events need to be identified with the date, hour, minute
and second when they occurred.
The events recorded and stored in memory should be collected
locally and remotely.
RDTC-28 At least the following types of events should be recorded:
• Change in DTC configuration, carried out either locally or
remotely.
• Firmware update. Every change carried out on the equip-
ment should be auditable.
• DTC clock/calendar adjustment (date and time).
• Voltage fault by phase.
• Restoring voltage by phase.
• Fatal error of equipment or part (e.g. on modules).
• Non-fatal errors of equipment or part (e.g. on modules).
• Local and remote access (with differentiation of the 2
modes).
• Command and control actions on external devices.
The DTC needs to record log information regarding communica-
tion with the EBs.
Table 3.16: Record of Events Requirements
Req Description
RDTC-29 The system should include a real-time clock (RTC), which should
come with a run reserve of at least 5 years. Synchronization shall
be performed via the communication received from upstream. The
DTC clock time should never deviate from that of the reference
clock (upstream) by more than 1 minute.
Table 3.17: Clock Requirements
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Req Description
RDTC-30 Aggregation of measures, with a breakdown of the measurement
of power and public lighting circuit transformers as per requisites
set for the energy box.
RDTC-31 The ability to locally and remotely program rate cycles (e.g. daily,
weekly), standard time periods (winter, summer), holidays of me-
tering modules associated with power and public lighting transfor-
mers.
Table 3.18: Hourly Breakdown Requirements
3.2.3 Energy Box Functional Requirements
The EB is a device consisting of sensors, meters and actuators which will replace the current meter
at customer home. It includes a set of functions that goes well beyond power metering allowing a
detailed characterization of consumptions (accessible both locally for the consumer and remotely
for the operator). The EB sets the connection between the various low-voltage grid customers and
the switching subtation, via the DTC. The EB also comprises a set of current and future needs of
each consumer, grid operator, marketer, institutional, among others. We describe from table 3.19
through 3.27 all the relevant energy box requirements.
Req Description
REB-01 Measurement of active power in both directions.
REB-02 Measurement of reactive power with breakdown in the 4 qua-
drants.
REB-03 Measurement of maximum power during a configurable integration
period from 1 to 60 minutes. The criterion for maximum power
is based on the following expression: Max[ P(kW)]=Max[E(kWh)/
period(h)]. The recorded figure is reset, preferably by default at
the start of each billing period. The grid may also perform this
reset locally or remotely, while memorizing the current value.
REB-04 Record of date and time of maximum active power during the set
integration period. Such an indication is useful if it migrates to
an low voltage rate system that allows for the billing of the power
conditions as a function of the value of the peak demand recorded
during the billing period.
REB-05 There should be a total record for each variables to be measured
(for current and voltages).
Table 3.19: Power Meter Requirements
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Req Description
REB-06 Figures for consumptions and productions occurring during confi-
gurable integration periods of 15, 30 or 60 minutes of the active
energy and reactive energy.
REB-07 Storage of expected information in regulatory terms relative to the
quality of service. The system shall store data regarding the qua-
lity of service during a period of at least one year. It needs at least
to consider the number and duration of each supply outage lasting
at least 3 minutes, as well as the time when the effective voltage
figure is outside the regulatory limits.
REB-08 The system needs to store the information required for billing (his-
toric figures, billing data, rates) pertaining to the last 6 billing clo-
sures, to allow customers for billing validation.
It also needs to keep on file the figure of the peak demand recor-
ded in the last 6 billing periods.
At the close of each billing period, the figures for other measu-
red variables also need to be stored, namely regarding maximum
power occurring during that period and the figures for totals.
The close of billing periods needs to be configurable, supporting
the selection of any day of the month, configured either remotely
or locally. It will be necessary to pay particular attention to the
situations in which the selected day corresponds to the 31st or, in
the case of February, the 29th day.
REB-09 The system should record the daily close of billing, the total and
by rate, by 00:00:00, and keep it for 45 days.
REB-10 We need to record the status information related to each integra-
tion period, whenever at least one of the following events listed
under table 3.26 has occurred.
REB-11 When there is a prolonged power outage, the data need to remain
kept in memory for at least 3 years.
Table 3.20: Storage Information Requirements
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Req Description
REB-12 Change of rate option. The system should allow for remote
change of contractual rate option, provided this is the customer’s
intention together with his marketer. It should also allow be remo-
tely updated for change of the table showing holidays and official
time.
REB-13 Regulation of power control. The system should enable the
contracted power value to be remotely controlled.
REB-14 Possibility of outage/reactivation of supply. The system should
make possible to remotely and totally switch off/reactivate a
customer, for reasons of contract non-compliance, deactiva-
ting/reactivating contracts, technical faults at the customer’s facility
(fraud detection), among others.
REB-15 Remote date/time synchronization from the DTC.
Table 3.21: Parameterization and Remote Meter Actuation Requirements
Req Description
REB-16 Access to the instantaneous load / power value. The system
should make sure the customer can see the instantaneous power
value, while showing the percentage of the integration period.
REB-17 Presentation of accumulated values for comparing with billing va-
lues. The system should provide the customer with access to
billed consumption and a history of measurements.
REB-18 Notice of maximum power taken. The system should show the
value of maximum power attained within the current rate period,
as well as the value history when selected.
REB-19 The system needs to support delivery of plain messages to the
customer in such a way that he is informed of outages and sche-
duled maintenance, as well as other events to be detailed. These
messages should remain visible on the display until the customer
accepts it accordingly or until the reference date expires.
REB-20 The information should be organized in easy-access, easy-to-
understand menus, thereby making for easier interaction with the
customer.
REB-21 The system should show consumptions pertaining to each confi-
gured rate and indication of the active rate.
Table 3.22: Interface with the Consumer Requirements
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Req Description
REB-22 Record of the number of long supply outages. The system should
record the number of service outages lasting more than a gi-
ven period of time, remotely configurable by the grid operator (for
example ≥ 3 minutes), depending on the quality of service regu-
lation.
REB-23 Record of the duration of long outages. The system should record
the duration of the outages referred to under the previous requi-
site.
REB-24 Record of the accumulated time when the voltage level exceeds
the limits set by the quality of service regulation.
Table 3.23: Quality of Service Requirements
Req Description
REB-25 EB remote firmware update. With the EB system expected to
evolve, the resident software in the EB needs to be subject to re-
mote updating so as to provide error correction, an eventual func-
tional increase and investment protection. The firmware needs to
be developed in the form of modules so as to provide easy in-
tegration and breakdown, even allowing for these modules to be
updated. The metrological firmware (appearing in the meter and
in calibration, for example) is not subject to change. There should
be a log associated with updating. Every change carried out on
the equipment should be auditable.
Table 3.24: Firmware Update Requirements
Req Description
REB-26 The system should be prepared to proceed with the power supply
outage, in order to meet grid management requisites (processing
branch congestions, restoring service, among others).
REB-27 The system needs to be prepared to momentarily limit the maxi-
mum power value in order to meet grid management requisites
(processing branch congestions, among others) .
This parameter may be implemented in the form of a reduction
corresponding to percentage value of the contracted power and,
as a supplement, via a fixed value.
The period when the power is limited should also be configurable.
Table 3.25: Technical Management Requirements
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Req Description
REB-28 It should be possible to record and store events in non-volatile
memory.
REB-29 At least the following types of events should be recorded:
a) Actuation of anti-fraud detection mechanisms and other supple-
mentary mechanisms that are supported by the system.
b) Changes to the status of the record that controls permission to
supply electricity.
c) Attempts to rearm while preventing the supply of active energy.
d) Change in the configuration of the EB, carried out either locally
or remotely.
e) EB clock / calendar adjustment (date and time).
f) Close of billing period.
g) Voltage fault and record of accumulated time when the voltage
level exceeds the limits set by the quality of service regulation.
h) Restoring the voltage.
i) Voltage fault by phase (where applicable).
j) Restoring voltage by phase (where applicable).
k) Fatal error of equipment or part (e.g. on modules).
l) Non-fatal errors of equipment or part (e.g. on modules).
m) Local and remote access (with differentiation of the 2 modes).
Table 3.26: Events Requirements
Req Description
REB-30 The system should include a real-time clock (RTC) for supporting
rate-related activity, among others, which should come with a run
reserve of at least 5 years and precision that is better than 5ppm
under reference conditions. Synchronization shall be performed
via the communication received from the DTC.
Table 3.27: Clock Requirements
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Chapter 4
InovGrid Security Analysis
In this chapter we analyze the InovGrid architecture considering security aspects. We start by ex-
plaining the methodology approach and the reasons for our options. Therefore in next sections
we decompose the entire system in components drawing data flow interactions between them as
also identifying vulnerabilities for all flows using the STRIDE approach from Microsoft [30]. After
identifying the vulnerabilities and their consequences we build, for each vulnerability, in each ar-
chitecture component, an attack tree describing the actions that could lead to a situation where
those vulnerabilities could be explored. We also provide a non analytical risk analysis considering
our understanding of the impact that the vulnerabilities have in all system and the probabilities of
being explored. Since we are in presence of a complex distributed system architecture we do not
decompose the applications in their modules.
4.1 Security Analysis Methodology
To make a security risk analysis to InovGrid we have adopted a five step methodology that com-
prises the following [31]:
1. Planning and collect all the information about the system.
2. Decompose the system in components in a reasonable way for an architectural view but also
from a security perspective, which means that each component must be chosen as a potential
target for attacks.
3. Identify vulnerabilities for the components and their interactions.
4. Build an attack tree for each target.
5. Rank the vulnerabilities in terms of risk.
Although this methodology is more often used when analyzing an application, we decided to adopt
it to make the InovGrid security analysis, which might be considered a large distributed system. We
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have chosen this methodology because is popular, simple to use and efficient in finding security
vulnerabilities. In each step of the methodology we can use different approaches and tools. As
an example in step two we might use different diagrams to decompose the system or different
vulnerabilities taxonomy performed in step three.
4.1.1 Planning and Collecting System Information
The step one of the methodology was already made in this document when we have identified
the InovGrid functional requirements and also when we have described the architecture (chapter
3). Each methodology, when applied, must be adapted to the scope and the results we want
to achieve. In our work we are interested in understand the InovGrid security vulnerabilities as a
whole system and not in a particular application or module. Therefore the information necessary for
our task is not at the level of applications source code but at a macro perspective of the architecture
elements, system functional requirements and the data flow interactions between components.
4.1.2 System Decomposing
The step two consists in decomposing the system in components and interaction among them. To
perform this activity we have decided to represent this architectural decomposition using Data Flow
Diagrams (DFD) [32] due to their simplicity and comprehensibility. These diagrams allow getting
an intuitive view of the architecture, showing all main components and data flows among them
that are relevant for the security analysis. In order to facilitate the identification of data flows it
should be performed a numeric identification for each component in the diagram. In section 4.2 we
decompose the system in three major views, each one for the major components of architecture
(information systems, distribution transformer controller and energy box) and perform a security
analysis based on data flow diagrams.
4.1.3 Identify Vulnerabilities (STRIDE approach)
The step three becomes easier once we have done a good decomposition in previous step. The
major concern at this phase is to find a good vulnerability taxonomy that allows making a consistent
analysis for each data flow. For being popular and simple we have adopted the STRIDE vulnerabi-
lities taxonomy from Microsoft [30]. This approach is a mnemonic which makes each letter of the
STRIDE word to correspond to common vulnerabilities, which we describe here:
• Spoofing identity - Spoofing means impersonating someone else to the computer or system.
An example of identity spoofing is illegally accessing using another user identity credential to
perform malicious actions as a legitimate user.
• Tampering with data - Data tampering involves the non-authorized or undetected modifica-
tion of data. Examples include unauthorized changes to persistent data, such as that held in
log repository.
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• Repudiation - Repudiation threats involve users who can deny performing an action without
other parties having any way to prove otherwise. For example, a user might repudiate power
meter figures from his installation. So non-repudiation refers to the ability of a system to
defend against repudiation threats.
• Information disclosure - Information disclosure threats involve the exposure of information
to individuals who are not supposed to access it, like an eavesdropper to access a customer
power consumption figures.
• Denial of service - Denial of service (DoS) attacks cause loss of service to valid users. As
an example we might experiment deny of service between the EB and the DTC.
• Elevation of privilege - In this scenario an unprivileged user obtains privileged access and,
thus, sufficient power to compromise or destroy the entire system. Elevation of privilege
threats include those situations in which an attacker has become trusted to the system as
privileged user which he might achieve, for example, by exploring some software vulnerability.
However we should remark that when we are doing the analysis with this taxonomy we might find
some data flows where a specific vulnerability does not make sense to analyze. As an example we
might consider a data flow which is a communication between a sensor and a system where the
information provided by the sensor is not dependent on a system privilege, thereby, does not make
sense to analyze the elevation of privilege scenario. In section 4.2 we perform a STRIDE analysis
for each data flow identified.
4.1.4 Build Attack Tree
The fourth step of this methodology is to build an attack tree for each vulnerability in each data flow
being analyzed. The depth and details of this tree should be adequate to our goals. In our scenario
building a detailed tree for all the six taxonomy vulnerabilities for every data flow could be a huge
endeavor without gain too much in the final result. So we have decomposed attacks only two levels
describing malicious actions that could be used to explore the identified vulnerabilities. In section
4.2 we build some simple attack trees after each STRIDE analysis.
4.1.5 Rank Vulnerabilities
The final step consists in ranking the vulnerabilities in terms of risk. This would require analyzing
again each single vulnerability considering its probability of being explored together with the impact
that it has in the business. There are good approaches for doing this task like the DREAD [33]
approach, however for the sake of simplicity and efficiency we decided to perform a high level risk
analysis, described in the section 4.3, where we enumerate the major vulnerabilities that urges to
mitigate and associated consequences.
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4.2 Data Flow Analysis and Attack Modeling
This section performs a security analysis focus on the three major architecture blocks: information
systems, distribution transformer controller and energy box. In each part we perform a system
decomposition, a STRIDE vulnerability analysis for each data flow identified and an attack tree to
explore those vulnerabilities.
4.2.1 Information Systems - Data Flow Analysis and Attack Modeling
The following picture depicts the data flow diagram from the interactions with the information sys-
tems. Each process or storage is identified by a number and an arrow explaining the data flow
between them and also identifying the functional requirements that it satisfies. In the analysis
that we make we are interested more in the data flows between the information systems and the
downstream equipments rather than in the interactions between users and system functionalities,
therefore the diagram that we have draw is more detailed in the former cases.
Figure 4.1: Information Systems Data Flow
4.2.1.1 Data Flow 2-1 - Collect and process power measure information.
This data flow consists in collecting, process and store information from the downstream distribution
transformer controllers and energy boxes. Analyzing vulnerabilities for this flow has the same bu-
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siness impacts as analyzing the consequence storage flows (1-3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7). If an attacker
could:
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity in this flow allows an attacker to send wrong in-
formation as a legitimate sender. Considering all the information
that is sent in this data flow an adversary can:
• cause financial harm to customers or electricity supply com-
pany by mixing with billing information.
• Cause society harm by cutting off public lighting.
• induce network operators in error by sending wrong load dia-
grams leading them to make wrong decisions that could af-
fect the network.
• cause financial and public image harm to electricity company
by changing quality of service information which leads to un-
due compensations and bad quality of service information to
the regulator.
• covering other attacks by changing alarms and log informa-
tion.
Tampering with Data Tampering the data in this flow allows to achieve the same results
as spoofing identity.
Repudiation The repudiation of information allows an adversary to repudiate all
the power consumption and production figures, thus leading to a
situation where he can refuse to accept his bills.
Information Disclosure The adversary could obtain important information about:
• network operation and leverage other type of attacks.
• quality of service data and disclose information that should
be kept confidential, causing harm to company public image.
• Infer about specific consumer habits.
• know important information for market about consumed and
produced energy.
Denial of Service The denial of service cause harm since:
• It might affect market operation since there is no timely infor-
mation.
• It can cause problems to network operations since grid sta-
tus and alarms are not available to plan and execute opera-
tions in a timely way.
Elevation of Privilege Elevation of privileges does not apply in this situation.
Table 4.1: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 2-1
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To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Send information from the legitimate distribution transformer controller.
(a) Obtain access to the distribution transformer controller.
(b) Tamper the distribution transformer controller and inserts a device or component to ma-
nipulate the communications module.
(c) Explore a distribution transformer controller software vulnerability.
(d) Run malicious software at the distribution transformer controller.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the distribution transformer controller and the
information systems.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection between the
distribution transformer controller and the information systems.
3. Access the information systems.
(a) Obtains an elevation of privileges and change the stored data.
(b) Explore a software vulnerability in the information systems.
(c) Access directly the storage device.
(d) Run malicious software at the information systems.
4.2.1.2 Data Flow 13-2 - Send configuration parameters for energy boxes and distribution
transformer controllers.
This data flow consists in sending configuration parameters for energy boxes and distribution trans-
former controllers. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity in this flow allows an attacker to send wrong
configuration data as a legitimate sender. Considering all the in-
formation that is sent in this data flow an adversary can send ma-
licious configuration information to downstream equipments in or-
der to achieve some attacks or cover other actions. For instance
an attacker can decide to configure the energy box to not raise
any alarm or event when updating a firmware. This way an atta-
cker could install a malicious firmware without being noticed. In
resume, the power to send wrong configuration parameter is a ve-
nue to perform a large number of other attacks.
Tampering with Data Tampering the data in this flow allows to achieve the same results
as spoofing identity.
Repudiation The repudiation of information does not leverage more attacks
than what was described.
Information Disclosure The adversary could obtain important information about how the
equipments are configured and perform attacks based on that in-
formation.
Denial of Service The denial of service will avoid the configuration to be sent to the
downstream equipments, thus avoiding the network operator to
manage correctly the power grid causing perturbation to the ser-
vice.
Elevation of Privilege Elevation of privileges does not apply in this situation.
Table 4.2: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 13-2
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access the information systems.
(a) Obtains an elevation of privileges and access the module to manipulate configuration
parameters.
(b) Explore a software vulnerability in the information systems.
(c) Run malicious software at the information systems.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the distribution transformer controller and the
information systems.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection to the distribution
transformer controller.
4.2.1.3 Data Flow 12-2 - Send information to control public lighting.
This data flow consists in sending configuration parameters for public lighting. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity in this flow allows an attacker to send wrong
configuration information as a legitimate sender. In this situa-
tion an adversary can cause public lighting blackout in some pu-
blic areas or inflict financial damages either to service provider or
consumers (usually municipalities).
Tampering with Data Tampering the data in this flow allows to achieve the same results
as spoofing identity.
Repudiation The repudiation of information does not leverage more attacks
than what was described.
Information Disclosure In this particular case the information disclosure does not allow
any kind of malicious actions since the control of public lighting in
normal situations is more or less predictable.
Denial of Service The denial of service will avoid the control to be performed which
might lead to a situation where the public lights will remain off
when needed and stay turned on when not needed, thus causing
a service perturbation with moderate financial damages.
Elevation of Privilege Elevation of privileges does not apply in this situation.
Table 4.3: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 12-2
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access the information systems.
(a) Obtains an elevation of privileges and access the module to send malicious controls to
public lighting.
(b) Explore a software vulnerability in the information systems.
(c) Run malicious software at the information systems.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the distribution transformer controller and the
information systems.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection to the distribution
transformer controller.
4.2.1.4 Data Flow 10-2 - Send information to control power supply.
This data flow consists in sending power supply control information downstream to distribution
transformer controllers and energy boxes. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity in this flow is very dangerous because the atta-
cker can:
• connect customers that should not have service due either
to technical issues or commercial disputes, causing financial
damages or service disturbances.
• causing major blackout with a dimension that depends on
the area (energy boxes) that the adversary can control.
Tampering with Data Tampering the data in this flow allows to achieve the same results
as spoofing identity.
Repudiation The repudiation of information does not leverage more attacks
than what was described.
Information Disclosure The information disclosure for this flow will permit an adversary to
get information about customers that are with and without power
and plan other action based on this information.
Denial of Service The denial of service will permit an adversary to maintain with
energy supply a customer that should be cut or, otherwise, to
maintain disconnected a customer that should have been recon-
nected.
Elevation of Privilege Elevation of privileges does not apply in this situation.
Table 4.4: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 10-2
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access the information systems.
(a) Obtains an elevation of privileges and access the module to send power control com-
mands.
(b) Explore a software vulnerability in the information systems.
(c) Run malicious software at the information systems.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the distribution transformer controller and the
information systems.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection to the distribution
transformer controller.
4.2.1.5 Data Flow 9-2 - Send information to regulate contracted power.
This data flow consists in sending information downstream to distribution transformer controllers
and energy boxes to regulate contracted power. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity in this flow is very dangerous because the atta-
cker can:
• allow customers to use more power than their electrical ins-
tallation permits, which might cause physical damages (e.g.
fire).
• it also allows the customers to pay less for a higher power
consumption contract causing financial damages to service
provider.
• cause service disturbance because an adversary might re-
gulated the contracted power at several customers that
possible could be limited by technical issues, causing da-
mages in electrical infrastructures often installed near public
spaces.
Tampering with Data Tampering the data in this flow allows to achieve the same results
as spoofing identity.
Repudiation The repudiation of information does not leverage more attacks
than what was described.
Information Disclosure The information disclosure for this flow will permit an adversary
to get important information about current network operation thus
leverage other type of attacks.
Denial of Service The denial of service will permit an adversary to maintain with
higher available power a customer that should be limited, for ins-
tance due to technical reasons, or illegitimately limit a customer
that has contracted more power.
Elevation of Privilege Elevation of privileges does not apply in this situation.
Table 4.5: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 9-2
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access the information systems.
(a) Obtains an elevation of privileges and access the module to send power control com-
mands.
(b) Explore a software vulnerability in the information systems.
(c) Run malicious software at the information systems.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the distribution transformer controller and the
information systems.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection to the distribution
transformer controller.
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4.2.1.6 Data Flow 8-2 - Send rate information.
This data flow consists in sending rate information downstream to distribution transformer control-
lers and energy boxes. If an attacker could:
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity in this flow allows an attacker to send wrong rate
information to downstream devices, making the customers to plan
their consumption based on wrong information and also causing
billing problems for marketers when checking the bills. This kind
of action might cause financial harm to both parts.
Tampering with Data Tampering the data in this flow allows to achieve the same results
as spoofing identity. Adding to previous attack scenarios an at-
tacker can send rate information from one marketer to customers
that have contracts with other marketers, that will lead to a chaotic
situation.
Repudiation The repudiation of information does not leverage more attacks
than what was described.
Information Disclosure The information disclosure for this flow will permit an adversary to
get important information about rates of a particular geographic
area, type of consumers or time periods, which will be valuable
information for other competitors marketer operators.
Denial of Service The denial of service will avoid information rates to be distributed
through the clients which might cause billing problems with harms
to both parties.
Elevation of Privilege Elevation of privileges does not apply in this situation.
Table 4.6: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 8-2
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access the information systems.
(a) Obtains an elevation of privileges and access the module to send wrong rate information.
(b) Explore a software vulnerability in the information systems.
(c) Run malicious software at the information systems.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the distribution transformer controller and the
information systems.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection to the distribution
transformer controller.
4.2.1.7 Data Flow 11-2 - Send firmware update.
This data flow consists in sending firmware updates downstream to energy boxes and distribution
transformer controllers. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity allows an attacker to send any firmware he wants
to be installed in distribution transformer controllers and energy
boxes. The distribution transformer controller and energy boxes
will accept this firmware because the attacker has explored a vul-
nerability that allows him to spoof identity. Installing malicious
firmware leverage any kind of future attacks, like change billing
information for customers, force outages by disconnecting energy
boxes or sending wrong values and states for information systems
leading to operation errors.
Tampering with Data Tampering the data in this flow allows to achieve the same results
as spoofing identity.
Repudiation Repudiation is important to analyze not because there exists other
consequences by exploring this type of vulnerability but because
the firmware update can be made remotely by the information sys-
tems or locally, by a service provider that plugs a device in the
distribution transformer controller. In a forensic analysis situation
it might exculpate an attacker.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he can ob-
tain the firmware, analyze it and then find ways to explore possible
vulnerabilities either in the energy boxes or distribution transfor-
mers controllers.
Denial of Service The denial of service will possibility an attacker to avoid the firm-
ware to be transfer to the distribution transformer controller and
energy boxes. This vulnerability only have serious consequences
if the firmware is urgent to fix any critical problem that causes harm
to company or the customers or, when this firmware will implement
new functionalities that should be operating at a specific time, re-
sulted from a commercial commitment.
Elevation of Privilege Elevation of privileges does not apply in this situation.
Table 4.7: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 11-2
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access the information systems.
(a) Obtains an elevation of privileges and access the module to send malicious firmware
updates.
(b) Explore a software vulnerability in the information systems.
(c) Run malicious software at the information systems.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the distribution transformer controller and the
information systems.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection to the distribution
transformer controller.
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4.2.1.8 Data Flow 19-2 - Send information to customer.
This data flow consists in sending downstream customer information to energy boxes, through
distribution transformer controllers. If an attacker could:
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity allows an attacker to send wrong customer in-
formation regarding scheduled interventions, commercial promo-
tional or energy efficiency campaigns. This lead to other type of
consequences, like making someone to stay at home waiting for
an inexistent local intervention or, for instance, announcing a plan-
ned outage which might induce a family to leave the home unat-
tended for the planned period. Also might give wrong commercial
information causing financial damages to both parties.
Tampering with Data Tampering the data in this flow allows to achieve the same results
as spoofing identity.
Repudiation Repudiation does not cause any additional harm in this data flows.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he can ob-
tain important information that is being transmitted to customers,
like interventions at their homes or market information such rates.
Denial of Service The denial of service will cause clients to not receive information
which might lead to service inconveniences and harm to service
provider quality of service.
Elevation of Privilege Elevation of privileges does not apply in this situation.
Table 4.8: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 19-2
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access the information systems.
(a) Obtains an elevation of privileges and access the module to send manipulated informa-
tion to customers.
(b) Explore a software vulnerability in the information systems.
(c) Run malicious software at the information systems.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the distribution transformer controller and the
information systems.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection to the distribution
transformer controller.
4.2.1.9 Data Flow 2-15 - Acquiring grid status information.
This data flow consists in collecting from distribution transformer controllers, grid status information.
If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity allows an attacker to send wrong grid information
for voltage figures or number for energy boxes without energy. If
the attacker spoofs this information he might lead to incorrect net-
work real time operations as also bad network management plan.
The consequences are service disturbances that can have a big-
ger or smaller impact depending in the adversary imagination and
capabilities.
Tampering with Data Tampering the data in this flow allows to achieve the same results
as spoofing identity.
Repudiation Repudiation does not cause any additional harm in this data flow.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he can ob-
tain important information about network management and plan
imaginative attacks based on that information.
Denial of Service The denial of service will cause grid status information not to reach
the technical systems which might cause operational problems
and service perturbations with an impact that depends how in-
genious the attacker is.
Elevation of Privilege Elevation of privileges does not apply in this situation.
Table 4.9: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 2-15
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Send information from the legitimate distribution transformer controller.
(a) Obtain access to the distribution transformer controller.
(b) Tamper the distribution transformer controller and inserts a device or component to ma-
nipulate the communications module.
(c) Explore a distribution transformer controller software vulnerability.
(d) Run malicious software at the distribution transformer controller.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the distribution transformer controller and the
information systems.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection between the
distribution transformer controller and the information systems.
4.2.1.10 Data Flows for user interfaces 14 and 18 - Information systems users interface.
This data flow consists in information changed between users and the information systems (14-9,
14-10, 14-11, 14-12, 14-13, 15-14, 14-16, 17-18). If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity allows an attacker to perform action as legitimate
user. He might get different identities with different roles and per-
form all the functions pertaining to that role. In some scenarios,
depending on the user profile authorizations, he might be allowed
to perform any action like power outages or changing billing infor-
mation.
Tampering with Data Tampering the data in this flow allows to achieve the same results
as spoofing identity.
Repudiation Repudiation in this interaction does not cause any additionally
harm however it might exculpate an attacker, because malicious
actions performed under an identity would not be identified.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he can
obtain important information about network management, market
operation. Obviously this information could leverage several im-
portant attacks.
Denial of Service The denial of service will impossibility users to interact with the
system which might cause service and market perturbations.
Elevation of Privilege Elevation of privileges permits an attacker to access more infor-
mation system functions which might allow him not only to send
any command to the network but also change stored information,
delete logs or change software.
Table 4.10: STRIDE Analysis for user interfaces Data-Flows
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access the Information Systems
(a) Stole credential from other users.
(b) Explore information systems software vulnerabilities.
(c) Run malicious software at the information systems.
4.2.2 Distribution Transformer Controller - Data Flow Analysis and Attack
Modeling
The following picture depicts the data flow diagram from the interactions with the DTC. Each process
or storage is identified by a number and an arrow explaining the data flow between them.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution Transformer Controller Data Flow Analysis
We start to analyze each data flow, describing vulnerabilities using the STRIDE taxonomy and
define attack vectors for each vulnerability.
4.2.2.1 Data Flow 1-2 - Record date and time of maximum power by rate type.
This data flow consists in storing the date and time of the maximum power. If an attacker could:
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity does not make sense to analyze in this situation.
Tampering with Data Tampering date and time of maximum power lead to a situation
where the electrical company could take wrong operational deci-
sions and also create problems when performing financial analysis
of consumptions.
Repudiation The repudiation of information does not make sense in this situa-
tion.
Information Disclosure The adversary could obtain important information about the per-
iods where the maximum power occurs and plan an attack based
on that information.
Denial of Service The denial of service will impact in storing information for maxi-
mum power, which impacts, at least, in the billing process.
Elevation of Privilege Elevation of privileges does not apply in this situation.
Table 4.11: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 1-2
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To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access directly the storage device of the distribution transformer controller.
(a) Access some distribution transformer controller network service and obtain privileges to
change stored information.
(b) Tamper the distribution transformer controller and inserts a device to manipulate the
stored information.
4.2.2.2 Data Flow 1-3 - Record load diagram of power.
This data flow consists in storing the load diagram of power. If an attacker could:
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Not applicable in this scenario.
Tampering with Data Tampering with this data flow allows an attacker to induce in error
the electrical power company, making them use wrong information
to plan its operations.
Repudiation Not Applicable.
Information Disclosure The adversary could obtain important information about power
consumption in a geographic area and plan an attack considering
this information (e.g. cause a blackout that affects a major number
of customers).
Denial of Service The denial of service will impact in storing information for load dia-
grams which might cause some problems for the network operator
will be unable to use it.
Elevation of Privilege Not applicable in this data flow.
Table 4.12: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 1-3
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access directly the storage device of the distribution transformer controller.
(a) Access some distribution transformer controller network service and obtain privileges to
change stored information.
(b) Tamper the distribution transformer controller and inserts a device to manipulate the
stored information.
4.2.2.3 Data Flow 1-4 - Record load diagram of public lighting power.
This data flow consists in storing the load diagram of public lighting power. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Not Applicable.
Tampering with Data Tampering with this data flow allow an attacker to induce the elec-
trical power company to use wrong information to plan their public
lighting grid operations.
Repudiation Not Applicable.
Information Disclosure The adversary could obtain important information about public
lighting power consumption in a geographic area and plan an at-
tack considering this information, for instance causing a blackout
that affect a major number of streets.
Denial of Service The denial of service does not cause any special harm since this
information is not used for real time electrical network operations,
however it might cause some inconvenience since the service pro-
vider needs this information to plan its network operations.
Elevation of Privilege Not Applicable.
Table 4.13: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 1-4
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access directly the storage device of the distribution transformer controller.
(a) Access some distribution transformer controller network service and obtain privileges to
change stored information.
(b) Tamper the distribution transformer controller and inserts a device to manipulate the
stored information.
4.2.2.4 Data Flow 1-5 - Record figures for consumption and production.
This data flow consists in storing the figures for consumption and production. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Not Applicable.
Tampering with Data Tampering with this data flow allow an attacker to change impor-
tant information that allows electrical company service provider to
plan and maintain the electrical grid. Based on wrong information
the company might take wrong decisions when comes to operate
the grid or checking balance sheets for energy.
Repudiation Not Applicable.
Information Disclosure The adversary could obtain important information about power
consumption and production in a geographic area and plan an at-
tack considering this information, for instance causing a blackout
that affect a major number of customers.
Denial of Service The denial of service does not cause any special harm since this
information is not used for real time electrical network operations,
however it might cause some inconvenience since the service pro-
vider needs this information to plan its network operations.
Elevation of Privilege Not Applicable.
Table 4.14: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 1-5
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access directly the storage device of the distribution transformer controller.
(a) Access some distribution transformer controller network service and obtain privileges to
change stored information.
(b) Tamper the distribution transformer controller and inserts a device to manipulate the
stored information.
4.2.2.5 Data Flow 1-6 - Record figures for public lighting consumption.
This data flow consists in storing figures for public lighting power consumption. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Not Applicable.
Tampering with Data Tampering with this data flow allow an attacker to change impor-
tant information that allows electrical company service provider
to plan and maintain the public lighting electrical grid. Based on
wrong information the company might take wrong decisions when
comes to operate the grid and suffer financial damages when
billing the public lighting consumption.
Repudiation Not Applicable.
Information Disclosure The adversary could obtain important information about public
lighting figures consumption and discloses the information without
authorization jeopardizing the company image. It also can use this
information to cause financial damages to municipalities.
Denial of Service The denial of service for this flow avoids the storage of information
causing the impossibility to bill for public lighting consumption due
to the lack of data.
Elevation of Privilege Not Applicable.
Table 4.15: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 1-6
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access directly the storage device of the distribution transformer controller.
(a) Access some distribution transformer controller network service and obtain privileges to
change stored information.
(b) Tamper the distribution transformer controller and inserts a device to manipulate the
stored information.
4.2.2.6 Data Flow 1-7 - Record quality of service.
This data flow consists in storing quality of service information. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Not Applicable.
Tampering with Data Tampering with this data flow allow an attacker to change impor-
tant information related with quality of service which could lead
the company to have public image problems or to pay financial
penalties that are not due.
Repudiation Not Applicable.
Information Disclosure The adversary could obtain important information about quality of
service and discloses the information without authorization jeo-
pardizing the company image. It also can use this information to
cause damages to municipalities.
Denial of Service The denial of service for this flow avoids the storage of information
causing the impossibility to provide quality of service information
which might cause regulatory problems.
Elevation of Privilege Not Applicable.
Table 4.16: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 1-7
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access directly the storage device of the distribution transformer controller.
(a) Access some distribution transformer controller network service and obtain privileges to
change stored information.
(b) Tamper the distribution transformer controller and inserts a device to manipulate the
stored information.
4.2.2.7 Data Flow 23-8 - Store information from energy boxes.
This data flow consists in storing information from energy boxes. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity will allow an adversary to send energy box infor-
mation as if it was the legitimate energy box. This way an atta-
cker can cause financial damages either to a customer or power
company by sending manipulated information to be stored in the
distribution transformer controller (technical or billing information).
Tampering with Data Tampering with this data flow allow an adversary to perform the
same actions as in the spoofing identity situation.
Repudiation If an attacker can repudiate the information sent in this data flow,
then it can avoid to be billed since he can claim that the informa-
tion collected is not from his energy box, thus causing financial
damages to power company.
Information Disclosure The adversary could obtain important information about customer
bills that will bring up privacy problems.
Denial of Service The denial of service for this flow avoids the storage of informa-
tion collected from the meter causing problems when billing the
customer.
Elevation of Privilege Not Applicable.
Table 4.17: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 23-8
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Send information from the legitimate customer energy box.
(a) Obtain access to the energy box services and send manipulated information.
(b) Tamper the energy box and inserts a device or component to manipulate the communi-
cations module.
(c) Explore an energy box software vulnerability.
(d) Run malicious software at the energy box.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the energy box and the distribution transformer
controller.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
4.2.2.8 Data Flow 11-10-16 - Control Public lighting timetable, connection and disconnec-
tion.
This data flow consists in sending commands to control the public lighting timetable as also to
control its connection or disconnection. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity will allow an adversary to send commands to the
public lighting control as if they are from a legitimate process. In
this situation the attacker can control the period when public lights
are turn on or simple create a blackout in public streets in order to
leverage other malicious actions such robbery.
Tampering with Data Tampering with this data flow allow an adversary to perform the
same actions as in the spoofing identity situation.
Repudiation Repudiate information in this data flow does not cause additional
harm.
Information Disclosure The adversary could obtain information about time timetables and
connection/disconnection control, however is not such valuable in-
formation since most of it are almost predictable.
Denial of Service The denial of service for this flow unable commands for public
lighting which might have moderate impacts, like not connecting
the lights at the right times or simple keep the lights on during the
day.
Elevation of Privilege Not Applicable.
Table 4.18: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 11-10-16
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Send information from information systems.
(a) Obtain access to the information systems and manipulate information sent to distribution
transformer controller.
(b) Explore an information system software vulnerability.
(c) Run malicious software at the information system.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the information systems and the distribution
transformer controller.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
3. Access the distribution transformer controller to send public lighting information
(a) Obtain access to the distribution transformer controller services and send manipulated
information.
(b) Explore a distribution transformer controller software vulnerability.
(c) Run malicious software at the distribution transformer controller.
(d) Tampering the distribution transformer controller and hijack commands to public lighting.
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4.2.2.9 Data Flow 11-10-14 - Control distribution transformer controller functions.
This data flow consists in control distribution transformer controller functions. If an attacker could:
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity will allow an adversary to control important dis-
tribution transformer controller’s functions like monitoring the envi-
ronment temperature or the load of power transformers. Control-
ling this information is critical because the adversary might induce
the grid operation to perform wrong actions or simple causing pa-
nic by triggering alarms in several distribution transformer control-
lers at same time.
Tampering with Data Tampering with this data flow will permit to achieve the same at-
tacks like the identity spoofing situation.
Repudiation The repudiation of the information in this data flow does not cause
any particular harm.
Information Disclosure The adversary could obtain important information on how the ser-
vice provider operates the network and use it to leverage other
attacks like the ones described above.
Denial of Service The denial of service for this flow avoids the change of the para-
meters for important functions, which might cause operation pro-
blems, since the network is managed as the DTC was with the
correct parameters.
Elevation of Privilege Not Applicable.
Table 4.19: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 11-10-14
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Send information from information systems.
(a) Obtain access to the information systems and manipulate information sent to distribution
transformer controller.
(b) Explore an information system software vulnerability.
(c) Run malicious software at the information system.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the information systems and the distribution
transformer controller.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
3. Access the Distribution Transformer Controller to control its functions.
(a) Obtain access to the distribution transformer controller services and send manipulated
information.
(b) Explore a distribution transformer controller software vulnerability.
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(c) Run malicious software at the distribution transformer controller.
(d) Tampering the distribution transformer controller and hijack commands to control DTC’s
functions.
4.2.2.10 Data Flow 11-10-12 - Control circuit breaker transformers.
This data flow consists in control circuit breaker transformers. If an attacker could:
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity will allow an adversary to control with a legitimate
identity the transformer’s circuit breakers. This is critical since this
control allows to disconnect all clients downstream the transfor-
mer.
Tampering with Data Tampering with this data flow will permit to achieve the same at-
tacks like the identity spoofing situation.
Repudiation The repudiation of the information in this data flow does not cause
any particular harm.
Information Disclosure In this particular situation it does not cause any harm.
Denial of Service The denial of service for this flow avoids the control of the po-
wer transform circuit breakers which might cause problems, be-
cause the operation teams might need to disconnect or connect
the circuit breakers and will be unable to do so, causing service
problems.
Elevation of Privilege Not Applicable.
Table 4.20: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 11-10-12
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Send information from information systems.
(a) Obtain access to the information systems and manipulate information sent to distribution
transformer controller.
(b) Explore a information system software vulnerability.
(c) Run malicious software at the information system.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the information systems and the distribution
transformer controller.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
3. Access the Distribution Transformer Controller to send commands for circuit breakers.
(a) Obtain access to the distribution transformer controller services and send manipulated
information.
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(b) Explore a distribution transformer controller software vulnerability.
(c) Run malicious software at the distribution transformer controller.
(d) Tampering the distribution transformer controller and hijack commands to circuit brea-
kers.
4.2.2.11 Data Flow 25-23 - Costumers without electricity supply.
This data flow consists in identifying customers without electricity supply, which means the distri-
bution transformer controller broadcast a signal and waits for the reply of the energy box. If an
attacker could:
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity will allow an adversary to send a legitimate reply
answer from a energy box, being the energy box inactive. This
will enable an adversary to cover a situation where a number of
customers are not provided with electricity delaying any response
from the service provider.
Tampering with Data Tampering with this data flow will permit to achieve the same at-
tacks like the identity spoofing situation.
Repudiation The repudiation of the information in this data flow does not cause
any particular harm.
Information Disclosure In this particular situation an attacker might obtain information
about customers on a given area without power suply and use this
information to market competitors or to leverage other malicious
actions (e.g. robbery).
Denial of Service The denial of service for this flow allows the same consequences
described in the spoof identity scenario.
Elevation of Privilege Not Applicable.
Table 4.21: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 25-23
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Control information from energy box.
(a) Obtain access to the energy box services and control the reply messages to DTC.
(b) Explore an energy box software vulnerability.
(c) Run malicious software at the energy box.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the energy box and the distribution transformer
controller.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
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4.2.2.12 Data Flow 24-25-11 - Monitor low voltage bus value.
This data flow consists in monitor the voltage module value in terms of the low voltage busbar, by
providing valid information to the DMS system (for example, for voltage control functionalities). If
an attacker could:
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity will allow an adversary to send wrong voltage in-
formation as a legitimate sender, inducing the operation in errors,
causing damage in the service.
Tampering with Data Tampering with this data flow will permit to achieve the same at-
tacks like the identity spoofing situation.
Repudiation The repudiation of the information in this data flow does not cause
any particular harm.
Information Disclosure Obtains this information allow an attacker to know about grid net-
work operations in order to leverage other attacks.
Denial of Service The denial of service for this flow unable the sending of voltage
information, thus also unable a informed response by the network
operations control.
Elevation of Privilege Not Applicable.
Table 4.22: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 24-25-11
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access the distribution transformer controller to send voltage information
(a) Obtain access to the distribution transformer controller services and send manipulated
information.
(b) Explore a distribution transformer controller software vulnerability.
(c) Run malicious software at the distribution transformer controller.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the information systems and the distribution
transformer controller.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
4.2.2.13 Data Flow 26-25-11 - Sending alarms for imbalance or overload phases.
This data flow consists in sending alarms regarding overload or imbalance phases at switch sub-
station. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity will allow an adversary to send wrong information
about overload or imbalance of phases, inducing the operation in
errors, causing damage in quality of the service.
Tampering with Data Tampering with this data flow will permit to achieve the same at-
tacks like the identity spoofing situation.
Repudiation The repudiation of the information in this data flow does not cause
any particular harm.
Information Disclosure Obtains this information allow an attacker to know about grid net-
work operations in order to leverage other attacks.
Denial of Service The denial of service for this flow unable the sending of voltage in-
formation, thus avoiding a informed response by the network ope-
rations control.
Elevation of Privilege Not Applicable.
Table 4.23: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 26-25-11
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access the distribution transformer controller to send manipulated alarm information.
(a) Obtain access to the distribution transformer controller services and send manipulated
information.
(b) Explore a distribution transformer controller software vulnerability.
(c) Run malicious software at the distribution transformer controller.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the information systems and the distribution
transformer controller.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
4.2.2.14 Data Flow 11-19 - Firmware update.
This data flow consists in sending a firmware update to the distribution transformer controller. If an
attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity An attacker can send any firmware he wants to be installed in
distribution transformer controller. The distribution transformer
controller will accept this firmware because the attacker has ex-
plored a vulnerability that allows him to spoof identity. Installing
malicious firmware leverage any kind of future attacks, like change
billing information for customers, force outages by disconnecting
energy boxes or sending wrong values and states for information
systems leading to operation errors.
Tampering with Data The consequences are the same as the situation of spoofing iden-
tity however here the attacker does not use a legitimate identity.
Repudiation The repudiation is important to analyze not because there exists
other consequences by exploring this type of vulnerability but be-
cause the firmware update can be made remotely by the informa-
tion systems or locally, by a service provider that plugs a device in
the distribution transformer controller. In a forensic analysis situa-
tion it might exculpate an attacker.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he can ob-
tain the firmware, analyze it and then find ways to explore possible
vulnerabilities.
Denial of Service The denial of service will make possible an attacker to avoid the
firmware to be transfer to the distribution transformer controller.
This vulnerability only have serious consequences if the firmware
is urgent to fix any critical problem that causes harm to company
or the customers or, when this firmware will implement new func-
tionalities that should be operating at a specific time, resulted from
a commercial commitment.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analyze in this data flow case.
Table 4.24: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 11-19
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Send information from information systems.
(a) Obtain access to the information systems and manipulate firmware to be sent to distri-
bution transformer controller.
(b) Explore an information system software vulnerability to send tampered firmware to DTC.
(c) Run malicious software at the information system to send tampered firmware to DTC.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the information systems and the distribution
transformer controller.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
3. Access the distribution transformer controller to install firmware.
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(a) Obtain access to the distribution transformer controller services and update firmware.
(b) Tampering the distribution transformer controller and hijack commands to update firm-
ware.
4.2.2.15 Data Flow 17-18 - Store events
This data flow consist in storing events occurred in the distribution transformer controller. If an
attacker could:
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity does not apply in this data flow.
Tampering with Data Tampering data to manipulate the event information might lead to
cover a various number of attacks. For instance it allows chan-
ging log information about remote and local distribution transfor-
mer controller accesses, making impossible to detect who might
have done malicious actions in the equipment. By exploring this
vulnerability it is also possible, for instance, to attack the clock by
adjusting the time without the action being logged. In resume ex-
ploiting this vulnerability allows hiding or deceiving the event ana-
lysis.
Repudiation The repudiation of information in this scenario does not cause any
harm situation different from previous.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he obtains
important information about network operation, such power loads
and technical maintenance, enabling the adversary to leverage
other attacks.
Denial of Service The denial of service will make possible an attacker to prevent
event information from being registered and again to deceive or
unable event analysis.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analyze in this data flow case.
Table 4.25: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 17-18
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the actions described in the follo-
wing attack tree.
1. Access the distribution transformer controller to manipulate stored events.
(a) Access a distribution transformer controller network service and obtain privileges to
change stored information.
(b) Access directly to the storage device of the distribution transformer controller.
(c) Tamper the distribution transformer controller and inserts a device to manipulate the
stored information.
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4.2.2.16 Data Flow 11-22-15 - Connect and disconnect independent circuits
This data flow consists in sending information for connect and disconnect independent circuits such
as condenser batteries or public lighting. If an attacker could:
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity then it can control the network as he wish and
cause some relevant blackouts or financial damages.
Tampering with Data Tampering data in this data flow will permit to perform the same
attacks as in the spoof identity scenario.
Repudiation The repudiation of information in this scenario does not cause any
harm situation different from previous.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he obtains
important information about network operation that allows an ad-
versary to leverage other attacks.
Denial of Service The denial of service will make possible an attacker to prevent
automation or remote control to act in the independent circuits,
causing harm to service.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analyze in this data flow case.
Table 4.26: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 11-22-15
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the actions described in the follo-
wing attack tree.
1. Send information from information systems.
(a) Obtain access to the information systems and manipulate information sent to distribution
transformer controller.
(b) Explore an information system software vulnerability.
(c) Run malicious software at the information system.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the information systems and the distribution
transformer controller.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
3. Access the distribution transformer controller to send commands for connect or disconnect
independent circuits
(a) Obtain access to the distribution transformer controller services and send manipulated
information.
(b) Explore a distribution transformer controller software vulnerability.
(c) Run malicious software at the distribution transformer controller.
(d) Tampering the distribution transformer controller and hijack commands to control inde-
pendent circuits.
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4.2.2.17 Data Flow 13-22-11 - Identifying default currents between phases
This data flow consists in identifying default currents between phases and send the signal of such
an occurrence locally and remotely. If an attacker could:
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity then an adversary can send alerts as he wish in
order to induce in error the network operator or any automation
algorithm causing harm to the service.
Tampering with Data Tampering data in this data flow will permit to perform the same
attacks as in the spoof identity scenario.
Repudiation The repudiation of information in this scenario does not cause any
harm situation different from previous.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he obtains
important information about network operation to leverage other
attacks.
Denial of Service The denial of service will make possible an attacker to prevent
automation or remote control to react in time.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analyze in this data flow case.
Table 4.27: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 13-22-11
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the actions described in the follo-
wing attack tree.
1. Access the distribution transformer controller to send default currents between phases infor-
mation.
(a) Obtain access to the distribution transformer controller services and send manipulated
information.
(b) Explore a distribution transformer controller software vulnerability.
(c) Run malicious software at the distribution transformer controller.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the information systems and the distribution
transformer controller.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
4.2.2.18 Data Flow 11-9-23 - Adjust Clock
This data flow consists in sending clock adjust information. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity If an attacker explore a spoof identity vulnerability then he can
send wrong clock information for distribution transformer control-
lers, which will leverage other attacks such change timestamps
in the logs events, or simple making the distribution transformer
controllers to store information with wrong timestamp and, thus,
invalidating billing information.
Tampering with Data The same consequences as the previous analysis for spoofing
identity.
Repudiation The repudiation of information in this scenario does not cause any
harm situation different from previous.
Information Disclosure There is no particular harm in this situation.
Denial of Service The denial of service will make possible an attacker to avoid the
clock from a distribution transformer controller from being adjus-
ted, thus leverage all the other attacks already mentioned.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analyze in this data flow case.
Table 4.28: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 11-9-23
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the actions described in the follo-
wing attack tree.
1. Send information from information systems.
(a) Obtain access to the information systems and manipulate clock information sent to dis-
tribution transformer controller.
(b) Explore an information system software vulnerability to send clock information to DTC.
(c) Run malicious software at the information system to send clock adjustment settings to
DTC.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the information systems and the distribution
transformer controller.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
3. Access the distribution transformer controller to adjust clock information.
(a) Obtain access to the distribution transformer controller services and adjust clock, either
for distribution transformer controller or to energy box.
(b) Tampering the distribution transformer controller and hijack commands to adjust clock.
4.2.2.19 Data Flow 21-20 - Interface with user
This data flow consists in interfacing the user with the distribution transformer controller. If an
attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity If an attacker explore a spoof identity vulnerability then he can act
as a legitimate user and perform any regular actions such upgrade
firmware, adjust service quality parameters or even control inde-
pendent circuits, causing any kind of harm, like blackouts through
financial damages.
Tampering with Data The same consequences as the previous analysis for spoofing
identity.
Repudiation The repudiation of information in this scenario does not cause any
harm situation different from previous, except that it might excul-
pate the attacker.
Information Disclosure If an attacker obtains this information he might infer important in-
formation on how to operate locally and leverage other kind of
attacks.
Denial of Service The denial of service not cause any special harm since the sys-
tems still can be operated and updated remotely.
Elevation of Privilege If the malicious user is able to elevate his privileges then he can
perform other actions like changing log information directly or ad-
just the clock. Exploring this vulnerability an adversary can per-
form any harm he wants.
Table 4.29: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 21-20
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the actions described in the follo-
wing attack tree.
1. Access the distribution transformer controller.
(a) Stole credential from other users.
(b) Explore distribution transformer controller software vulnerabilities.
4.2.2.20 Data Flow 11-23 - Data from information systems to energy box.
This data flow consists in sending data from information systems to energy boxes. If an attacker
could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity An attacker can spoof messages from information systems and
send tampered information to energy boxes, like bad firmware up-
dates, wrong clock adjustments or malicious cutting power com-
mands. An adversary that spoofs these messages can perform a
various number of attacks.
Tampering with Data The consequences are the same as the situation of spoofing iden-
tity however here the attacker does not use a legitimate identity.
Repudiation The repudiation here does not add more harm than what was des-
cribed.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he can, for
instance, obtain the firmware, analyze it and then find ways to ex-
plore possible vulnerabilities. An adversary can also obtain other
important information that allows him to infer customer behaviors.
Denial of Service The denial of service, for instance, will make possible an atta-
cker to avoid messages from information systems to reach energy
boxes causing services disturbances.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analyze in this data flow case.
Table 4.30: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 11-23
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Send information from information systems.
(a) Obtain access to the information systems and manipulate information sent to energy
boxes.
(b) Explore a information system software vulnerability to send information to energy boxes.
(c) Run malicious software at the information system to send information to energy boxes.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the information systems, the distribution trans-
former controller and the energy boxes.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
3. Access the distribution transformer controller to intercept messages to energy boxes.
(a) Obtain access to the distribution transformer controller services and controls messages
to energy boxes.
(b) Tampering the distribution transformer controller and hijack commands to energy boxes.
4.2.3 Energy Box - Data Flow Analysis and Attack Modeling
The following picture depicts the data flow diagram from the interactions with the energy box. Each
process or storage is identified by a number and an arrow explaining the data flow between them.
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Figure 4.3: Energy Box Data Flow Analysis
Now we will start to analyze each data flow and analyzing vulnerabilities using the STRIDE taxo-
nomy and describe attack vectors for each.
4.2.3.1 Data Flow 1-2 - Storing maximum power
This data flow consists in storing the maximum active power consumed collected from the meter. If
an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity An attacker can introduce any maximum power measurement that
he wants and deceive the customer and the service provider. If
the rate of the customer allows the billing of the power conditions
as a function of the value of the peak demand recorded during the
billing period, then an attacker can cause wrong billing information
with financial damages to the customer or the company.
Tampering with Data The same as the previous analysis for spoofing identity.
Repudiation The repudiation of information does not make sense in this si-
tuation since the active power is obtained directly from the meter
module.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he can ob-
tain customer power consumptions for a given time period and
infer about costumer habits. This is a privacy problem.
Denial of Service The denial of service will make possible an attacker to avoid the
meter values from being stored, thus, preventing the electrical po-
wer company to correct invoice the customer.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analyze in this data flow case.
Table 4.31: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 1-2
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access directly to the storage device of the energy box.
(a) Tamper the energy box to access directly an internal bus that allows access to the sto-
rage module (e.g. internal bus communications between the micro processor, meter and
storage modules, see figure 3.2).
(b) Access some energy box service and obtain privileges to change stored information.
(c) Run malicious software at energy box to manipulate the stored information.
2. Manipulate the metering module.
(a) Tamper the energy box and inserts a device to manipulate the meter functions.
4.2.3.2 Data Flow 1-3 - Figures for consumption and production
This data flow consists in storing the figures for consumption and production of a customer. If an
attacker could:
71
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity An attacker can introduce any consumption or production figures
that he wants and deceive the customer and the service provider.
For instance if an attacker can do this for a set of customers in a
specific zone, it may lead the company operator to make wrong
decisions in the network planning or bad calculation when doing
energy balance analysis. Also can induce the customer in error
about his habits and lead him to take bad decisions.
Tampering with Data The same consequences as the previous analysis for spoofing
identity.
Repudiation The repudiation of information does not make sense in this si-
tuation since this information is obtained directly from the meter
module and processed in the energy box.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he can ob-
tain figures from power consumptions or production for a given
time period and infer about costumer habits and resources. This
is a clear a privacy problem.
Denial of Service The denial of service will make possible an attacker to avoid the
consumption and production figures from being stored, thus, pre-
venting the electrical power company to correctly access the infor-
mation and use it for network management.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analyze in this data flow case.
Table 4.32: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 1-3
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access directly to the storage device of the energy box.
(a) Tamper the energy box to access directly an internal bus that allows access to the sto-
rage module (e.g. internal bus communications between the micro processor, meter and
storage modules, see figure 3.2).
(b) Access some energy box service and obtain privileges to change stored information.
(c) Run malicious software at energy box to manipulate the stored information.
2. Manipulate the metering module.
(a) Tamper the energy box and inserts a device to manipulate the meter functions.
4.2.3.3 Data Flow 1-4 - Quality of service information
This data flow consists in storing quality of service related information. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity An attacker can change the quality of service information. For
instance an attacker can change the number and the duration of
outages or accumulated time when the voltage level exceeds the
limits. This way the company might have to pay compensations
that were not due or simple affect the public image of the company
by a wrong perception of the service.
Tampering with Data The same consequences as the previous analysis for spoofing
identity.
Repudiation The repudiation of information does not make sense in this si-
tuation since this information is obtained directly from the meter
module and processed in the energy box.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he can ob-
tain the quality of service information and disclose it, causing da-
mage to companies’ public image.
Denial of Service The denial of service will make possible an attacker to avoid the
quality of service information from being stored, thus, preventing
the electrical power company to correct access the information as
also the customer to prove outages or voltage levels exceeds.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analyze in this data flow case.
Table 4.33: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 1-4
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access directly to the storage device of the energy box.
(a) Tamper the energy box to access directly an internal bus that allows access to the sto-
rage module (e.g. internal bus communications between the micro processor, meter and
storage modules, see figure 3.2).
(b) Access some energy box service and obtain privileges to change stored information.
(c) Run malicious software at energy box to manipulate the stored information.
2. Manipulate the metering module.
(a) Tamper the energy box and inserts a device to manipulate the meter functions.
4.2.3.4 Data Flow 1-5 - Billing information
This data flow consists in storing billing information from a customer. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity An attacker can change the billing information. For instance an
attacker can change historic figures, billing data or rate pertaining
to the last billing closures. This way he can injury both parties,
the company causing financial damages by making customers pay
less than they due or, in opposite, causing losses to clients by
making them to pay more.
Tampering with Data The same consequences as the previous analysis for spoofing
identity.
Repudiation The repudiation of information does not make sense in this si-
tuation since this information is obtained directly from the meter
module and processed in the energy box.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he can ob-
tain the billing information from the customer and infer about his
private live.
Denial of Service The denial of service will make possible an attacker to avoid the
billing information from being stored, thus, preventing the electrical
power company and the customer to correct access the informa-
tion and pay for the services.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analyze in this data flow case.
Table 4.34: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 1-5
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access directly to the storage device of the energy box.
(a) Tamper the energy box to access directly an internal bus that allows access to the sto-
rage module (e.g. internal bus communications between the micro processor, meter and
storage modules, see figure 3.2).
(b) Access some energy box service and obtain privileges to change stored information.
(c) Run malicious software at energy box to manipulate the stored information.
2. Manipulate the metering module.
(a) Tamper the energy box and inserts a device to manipulate the meter functions.
4.2.3.5 Data Flow 1-10-18 - Send power meter information
This data flow consists in sending power information from a customer (consumer/producer). If an
attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity An attacker can send information from the energy box to the
distribution transformer controller has a legitimate user/process.
This way the attacker can send wrong information to obtain finan-
cial benefits, like inform less power consumption than he really
has consumed or just send figures stating that he has produced
more power than what he has actually did, receiving this way,
illegitimate, more money. Also wrong information about power
consumption or production might lead the operator to take wrong
decision about network planning and operation, jeopardizing the
service and the society.
Tampering with Data Exploring this vulnerability has the same business consequences
as spoofing identity because the attacker might change the infor-
mation in order to obtain the same benefits.
Repudiation The repudiation of information is also an important vulnerability
to address, because if a customer denies to recognize the power
information sent from his energy box, then he can question all the
bills or compensations between him and the company.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he can ob-
tain the power information from the customer and infer about his
private live and use this information for non-legitimate acts.
Denial of Service The denial of service will make possible an attacker to unable
the energy box to send information to the distribution transformer
controller. The temporary deny of service in this data flow situa-
tion is not critical since this information will be stored in the energy
box and can be send latter.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analyze in this data flow case.
Table 4.35: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 1-10-18
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the actions described in the follo-
wing attack tree.
1. Send information from the legitimate customer’s energy box.
(a) Obtain access to the energy box services.
(b) Tamper the energy box and inserts a device or component to manipulate the communi-
cations module.
(c) Explore a energy box software vulnerability.
(d) Run malicious software at the energy box.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the energy box and the distribution transformer
controller.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
(b) Connects a device between the network and the communication’s module from the
energy box.
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4.2.3.6 Data Flow 18-12-9 - Firmware update
This data flow consists in sending a firmware update to the energy box. If an attacker could:
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity An attacker can send any firmware he wants to be installed in
energy box. The energy box will accept this firmware because
the attacker have explored a vulnerability that allows him to spoof
identity. Installing malicious firmware leverage any kind of future
attacks, like change billing information, force outages or limit elec-
tric power to customers. If an attacker could update a large num-
ber of energy box’s firmware than it could cause big damages to
the service provider and customers.
Tampering with Data The consequences are the same as the situation of spoofing iden-
tity however here the attacker does not use a legitimate identity.
Repudiation The repudiation is important to analyze not because there exists
other consequences by exploring this type of vulnerability, but be-
cause the firmware update can be made remotely by the distri-
bution transformer controller or locally, by a service provider that
plugs a device into the energy box. In a forensic analysis situation
it might exculpate an attacker.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he can ob-
tain the firmware, analyze it and then find ways to explore possible
vulnerabilities.
Denial of Service The denial of service will make possible an attacker to avoid the
firmware to be transfer to the energy box. This vulnerability only
have serious consequences if the firmware is urgent to fix any cri-
tical problem that causes harm to company or customers or when
this firmware will implement new functionalities that should be ope-
rating at a specific time, resulted from a commercial appointment.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analyze in this data flow case.
Table 4.36: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 18-12-9
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the actions described in the follo-
wing attack tree.
1. Send information from a legitimate upstream distribution transformer controller.
(a) Obtain access to distribution transformer controller services.
(b) Tamper the distribution transformer controller and inserts a device or component to ma-
nipulate the communications module.
(c) Explore a distribution transformer controller software vulnerability.
(d) Run malicious software at the distribution transformer controller.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the distribution transformer controller and energy
box.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
76
4.2.3.7 Data Flow 18-11-8 - Technical management
This data flow consists in sending technical management information to the energy box. If an
attacker could:
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity An attacker can send any technical management information as
he wants because he has explored a vulnerability that allows him
to spoof identity. The attacker could cut or limit power from custo-
mers causing big damages to society (for instance a robbery can
be planned to happen during a power-off period).
Tampering with Data The consequences are the same as the situation of spoofing iden-
tity however here the attacker does not use a legitimate identity.
Repudiation The repudiation is not important in this particular data flow.
Information Disclosure Disclosure of this type of information might only be useful to an at-
tacker in a specific situation where he can infer about grid network
operations and use this information to coordinate other actions or
simple disclose to the media outages information.
Denial of Service The denial of service will make possible a costumer not being cut
or limited during a deny of service period. This situation can be
explorer in a malicious way, if the power grid management needs
to limit or cut power in customers and cannot do it due to the deny
of service, jeopardizing the all service.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analyze in this data flow case.
Table 4.37: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 18-11-8
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the actions described in the follo-
wing attack tree.
1. Send information from a legitimate upstream distribution transformer controller.
(a) Obtain access to distribution transformer controller services.
(b) Tamper the distribution transformer controller and inserts a device or component to ma-
nipulate the communications module.
(c) Explore a distribution transformer controller software vulnerability.
(d) Run malicious software at the distribution transformer controller.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the distribution transformer controller and energy
box.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
4.2.3.8 Data Flow 18-14-13 - Parameter and remote actuation
This data flow consists in sending parameter and remote actuation commands to the energy box.
If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity If an attacker explore a spoof identity vulnerability then he can
do several things as a legitimate user. The attacker could send
outage and reactivation commands as he wish, making possible
to cut power from regular customers and reactivate defaulters.
An attacker can change the contract power of any customer, limi-
ting customer activity or simple allow him to consume more power
than he has contracted, which can be dangerous if the customer
installation is not prepared for.
The attacker can change the contract rate option, causing damage
to company or to customer.
It will also be possible to send wrong clock information for EBs,
which will leverage other attacks like change timestamps in the
logs events, or simple making the energy box to store billing infor-
mation with wrong timestamp invalidating the billing process.
Tampering with Data The same consequences as the previous analysis for spoofing
identity however there are mechanisms to detect this situation.
Repudiation The repudiation of information in this scenario does not cause any
harm situation different from previous.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he obtains
important information about network operations activity making
possible to leverage other attacks.
Denial of Service The denial of service will make possible an attacker to unable re-
mote parameterization and actuation which might cause service
disturbances, either technical or commercial.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analyze in this data flow case.
Table 4.38: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 18-14-13
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the actions described in the follo-
wing attack tree.
1. Send information from a legitimate upstream distribution transformer controller.
(a) Obtain access to distribution transformer controller services.
(b) Tamper the distribution transformer controller and inserts a device or component to ma-
nipulate the communications module.
(c) Explore a distribution transformer controller software vulnerability.
(d) Run malicious software at the distribution transformer controller.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the distribution transformer controller and energy
box.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
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4.2.3.9 Data Flow 16-17 - Store events
This data flow consists in storing events occurred in the energy box. If an attacker could:
Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity does not apply in this data flow.
Tampering with Data Tampering data to manipulate the event information might lead to
cover a various number of attacks. For instance it allows changing
information about remote and local energy box access, making
impossible to detect who might have done malicious actions in
the equipment. By exploring this vulnerability it is also possible
to attack the clock by adjusting the time without the action being
logged. In resume exploiting this vulnerability allows hiding or de-
ceiving the event analysis.
Repudiation The repudiation of information in this scenario does not cause any
harm situation different from previous.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he obtains
important information about customer, such power rates and tech-
nical maintenance, enabling the attacker to infer customer habits.
Denial of Service The denial of service will make possible an attacker to prevent
event information from being registered and again to deceive or
making impossible event analysis.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analyze in this data flow case.
Table 4.39: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 16-17
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the actions described in the follo-
wing attack tree.
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the following actions, structured in
the following attack tree:
1. Access directly to the storage device of the energy box.
(a) Tamper the energy box to access directly an internal bus that allows access to the sto-
rage module (e.g. internal bus communications between the micro processor, meter and
storage modules, see figure 3.2).
(b) Access some energy box service and obtain privileges to change stored information.
(c) Run malicious software at energy box to manipulate the stored information.
4.2.3.10 Data Flow 18-6-7 - Customer information
This data flow consists in displaying customer information. This information might be provided in
any computer device that connects from the HAN to the energy box. The client access the energy
box in order to access information important to him, like rate or power consume figures. If an
attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity Spoofing identity allows an attacker to access illegitimate informa-
tion from other individual. It enables to obtain important informa-
tion that can be used in malicious way (like the power consumption
profile from previous days and infer from the personal acts of the
victim). Spoofing identity from the energy box to the customer
allows to change the information and leverage malicious actions
like given wrong information about a planned outage, which might
led to a situation where the victim abandon his house during the
deceive outage period, opening a venue for a robbery.
Tampering with Data Tampering data will make possible an attacker to change infor-
mation displayed to customer and making him to execute some
actions based in wrong information (change rate or outage infor-
mation) with the consequences already described.
Repudiation The repudiation of information in this scenario does not cause any
harm situation different from previous.
Information Disclosure If the information is eavesdropped by an attacker than he obtains
important information about customer, such power rates and tech-
nical maintenance, enabling the attacker to infer customer habits.
Denial of Service The denial of service will make possible an attacker to prevent the
customer not to access the information which might cause some
inconvenience as not being prepared for a planned outage or po-
wer limitation.
Elevation of Privilege Does not make sense to analzse in this data flow case.
Table 4.40: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 18-6-7
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the actions described in the follo-
wing attack tree.
1. Send information from a legitimate upstream distribution transformer controller.
(a) Obtain access to distribution transformer controller services.
(b) Tamper the distribution transformer controller and inserts a device or component to ma-
nipulate the communications module.
(c) Explore a distribution transformer controller software vulnerability.
(d) Run malicious software at the distribution transformer controller.
2. Intercept or disrupt communications between the distribution transformer controller and energy
box.
(a) Connects a device directly in the network to jam or hijack a connection.
4.2.3.11 Data Flows 19-11, 19-12, 19-14 - Interface with user
This data flow consists in interfacing the user with the energy box. If an attacker could:
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Vulnerability Consequence
Spoofing Identity If an attacker explore a spoof identity vulnerability then he can act
as a legitimate user and perform any regular actions such upgrade
firmware, adjust rates or even control the maximum power, cau-
sing any kind of harm, like blackouts through financial damages.
Tampering with Data The same consequences as the previous analysis for spoofing
identity.
Repudiation The repudiation of information in this scenario does not cause any
harm situation different from previous, except that it might excul-
pate the attacker.
Information Disclosure If an attacker obtains this information he might infer important in-
formation on how to operate locally and leverage other kind of
attacks.
Denial of Service The denial of service not cause any special harm since the sys-
tems still can be operated and updated remotely.
Elevation of Privilege If the malicious user is able to elevate his privileges then he can
perform other actions like changing log information directly or ad-
just the clock. Exploring this vulnerability an adversary can per-
form any harm he wants.
Table 4.41: STRIDE Analysis for Data-Flow 19-11, 19-12, 19-14
To explore the described vulnerabilities an attacker can perform the actions described in the follo-
wing attack tree.
1. Access the energy box.
(a) Stole credential from other users.
(b) Explore energy box software vulnerabilities.
4.3 Risk Understanding
Considering the analysis done in previous section we believe that we have demonstrated all se-
curity risks that we are facing when implementing an architecture like InovGrid. The functionali-
ties described in the requirements section shows the level of information exchanged between all
the components but also the functionalities they provide. Automation, billing, monitoring, remote
control, dynamic software updates, events and alarms management are all important features that
will boost the efficiency of the way we produce and distribute energy in the near future, but also
demonstrates the need to protect these functionalities from malicious individuals and misuse.
Incorrect protection of the information exchanged in the InovGrid infrastructure might lead to:
• Repudiation scenarios where figures from energy consumption or production do not clearly
identify the consumer or producer origin. It should not be possible for a consumer or pro-
ducer to deny that the power figures are not from his installation which means that should
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be possible to clearly identify and prove messages origin (see table 4.35 an example about
repudiation consequences).
• We also might incur in a big risk for blackouts or, at least, some strong service perturbation if
we do not protect devices from running remote commands without knowing their authentica-
tion. For instance an adversary might disconnect power from a group of energy boxes or even
opens a transformer switch at a switching substation, causing a blackout in a certain region
(see table 4.20).
• Other important aspect is the customer privacy. From the analysis of power figures transmitted
upstream or the energy use information stored at the meter it is possible to infer customer
habits and behaviors that might be used to cause individual harm (like planning a robbery
when the customer is not at home, see table 4.35 an example about privacy consequences).
• A last point consensus the fact that if the security of one device is compromised than there
is a big chance that a vulnerability may be explored in all other devices of same type in the
network (there is an economic scale interest, which results in huge number of devices of same
type). Thus it is important to enforce that devices only run authorized and trusted software. So
it is especially important to protect against unauthorized firmware, software or configuration
updates.
The scenarios we have described above demonstrate that is essential to provide the InovGrid
infrastructure with mechanisms to enable non-repudiation; integrity and confidentiality. Obviously
that availability is the most important aspect in critical information infrastructures, although the
requirements that we have described here are more dependent in other security properties. That
happens because the InovGrid, at the release described in this document, is still more close to an
advanced metering infrastructure than a smart grid concept, however the project is moving towards
the new electrical grids paradigm with more control commands and automation functions.
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Chapter 5
Security Architecture for InovGrid
This chapter will focus in providing some guidelines for security solutions to address some attack
vectors described in previous chapter. As mentioned in the initial part of this work, the solutions
adopted should be part of a depth security strategy for a smart grid implementation. Each solution
”per si” will not work because no single security measure can counter all types of threats, so it is ne-
cessary to adopt a large number of solutions in the several layers of the architecture without loosing
the holistic view. Therefore, developing strong defense solutions in each architecture component
in an isolated approach might result in not getting the best solutions, either because it fails to fulfill
any requirement or we might achieving adopting unnecessary expensive solutions. As an example
it is not worthy to develop a costly solution to provide a strong log encryption at the energy box if
the logs are latter transmitted and stored in a log appliance with less encryption requirements.
Therefore this chapter starts describing a security architecture to address several security issues
related with InovGrid implementation. Our proposal focuses on problems related with authenticity,
non-repudiation and confidentiality, and how a public key infrastructure could help solving them.
5.1 Objectives
5.1.1 Authentication and Non-Repudiation
One of the objectives of the security architecture that we present in this section is to provide a fra-
mework to enable authentication and non-repudiation in the InovGrid. According to some sources
we have the following definitions [34]:
• Authentication. It is concerned with assuring that a communication is authentic. In the
case of a message the purpose of authentication service is to assure the recipient that the
message is from the source that it claims to be from. Two fundamental aspects are involved
in the authentication: First, at the time of connection initiation assuring that the two entities
are authentic and, second, that the service must assure that the connection is not tampered
in such a way that a third party can masquerade as one of the two legitimate parties.
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• Non-Repudiation. Is the property that prevents either sender or receiver from denying that
has transmitted a message. Thereby, when a message is sent, the receiver can prove that
the alleged sender in fact sent the message and when a message is received, the sender can
prove that the alleged receiver in fact received the message.
In the security analysis that we have done in the previous chapter we found out that some vulne-
rabilities related with identity spoofing or non-repudiation leads to big risks, like operation service
disruption or financial damages. As examples of the impacts we might remember the scenario
where one can send power cut off commands to energy boxes or customers denying power figures
sent from their equipments (see tables 3.20 and 3.21). To avoid these situations it is necessary
to assure that such commands are sent from authenticated entities and also that some critical
information is bind to some origin (consumer identification).
Therefore the need to establish an authenticated protocol security relies on the existence of a se-
curity association (SA) [35] also with authentication. To establish an authenticated SA it is required
that, at least, one party posses some sort of credential that can be used to provide assurance of
identity or device attributes to others. We might assume two types of credentials which are se-
cret keys, that are shared between entities, or public key certificates [36] for key establishment.
The former option is difficult to implement since it would be difficult to pre-establish a secret key
between each pair of devices in such big architecture, while the certificates are more flexible and
manageable. So we believe that a public key infrastructure is a powerful mechanism that can be
used to provide secure authentication and authorization for SA and key establishment.
5.1.2 Device Attestation
The overall security of smart grids and in InovGrid in particular will be dependent on the use of
devices with enhanced security. One aspect of device security is the device attestation [37] that is
the method to securely ascertain if a device has been tampered or presents the true identity of a
device it claims to be. For instance some attack venues that we have described earlier could result
from software vulnerabilities exploration. In order to prevent devices to be tamper with or vendors to
introduce malicious software in their equipments, a device attestation should be performed before
the device is actually installed into the network. The security architecture that we present here also
intends to support this security mechanism in order to mitigate risks from tampered devices.
5.1.3 Confidentiality
By confidentiality we understand [34]:
• Confidentiality. It concerns with the protection of transmitted data from passive attacks that
results in unauthorized disclosure.
There are not many confidentiality requirements to attend regarding the security analysis that we
have done previously. However there are two important aspects in this field: (1) electrical grid
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management information could be learned by malicious individuals and used to plan advanced
attacks; (2) customer privacy that is violated either by accessing the power consumption figures
from his installation or by disclosing the personal information stored at information systems. For the
customer privacy former case, as we already have mentioned before, it is possible to infer about
customer habits or behaviors if one can access frequently to instant or historic power computations.
Therefore it becomes important the way we transmit and store this information over the network.
The security architecture that we propose in next sections also has the objective to handle this
security issue.
5.2 Basic Tools
5.2.1 Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography [38] is a fundamental technique in security used for message authentica-
tion, confidentiality and key distribution. Public key algorithms are based on mathematical functions
rather than on typical operations on bit patterns like in symmetric encryption. This technique in-
volves the use of two separated keys, in contrast with symmetric cryptography that only needs one,
and comprises the following elements:
• Plaintext: A readable message or data to fed into the encryption algorithm as input.
• Encryption algorithm: Algorithm that performs the various transformations on plaintext.
• Public and private keys: Pair of keys selected in such way that, both keys can perform
encryption and decryption, and when one is used for encryption then the other is used for
decryption and vice-versa.
• Ciphertext: Scrambled message produced as output from the encryption algorithm. For a
given message, two different keys will produce two different ciphertexts.
• Decryption algorithm: Algorithm that accepts the ciphertext and the matching key and pro-
duces the original plaintext.
With this approach all participants have access to public keys, while private keys are generated
locally by each participant and must not be distributed. As long as private keys are protected the
communication is secure and if one changes its private key than the old related public keys also
needs to be replaced.
The uses of the keys, either private or public, are dependent on the application, but broadly we can
categorize their uses in the following:
• Encryption/Decryption: the sender encrypts the message with the recipient’s public key.
• Digital signature: the sender signs the message with its private key. Signing is equivalent to
apply the encryption algorithm together with its private key on the message or a block of data
that is a function of the message.
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• Key exchange: Two sides cooperate to derive a session key.
We might use different algorithms for all three listed applications for public key cryptography, ho-
wever we would like to mention the mostly used are RSA [39] and Diffie-Hellman [40]. The RSA is
a strong algorithm that serves all the three purposes, however the Diffie-Hellman is very powerful
and efficient for key exchange.
5.2.2 Public Key Certificates
One important aspect about public key encryption is that the public key is, by definition, public. That
means that any participant can present its public key to any other participants or broadcast its key
to the community. Therefore a malicious individual can pretend to be other user, for example user
A, by forging the announcement of a public key as being the user A’s public key. Until the real
user A discovers the forgery and alerts the participants the attacker can read encrypted messages
intended for A and also can use the forged keys for authentication.
The solution for this problem is to use public key certificates [36]. A public key certificate, or digital
certificate, is an electronic document which uses a digital signature to bind a public key with an
identity. The certificate holds information such as the name of a person or a device identification,
others important pieces of information like the expiration date and, obviously, the public key, with
the whole block signed by a trusted third party. This third party is usually a certification authority
(CA) trusted by the user community like the government or a recognized institution. An important
remark is that the user should present its public key to the authority in a secure manner and obtain
the certificate. The certificate can then be published or transmitted to participants and used to verify
that a public key belongs to an individual.
5.2.3 Trusted Computing
Trusted Computing (TC) [41] is a security concept developed and promoted by the Trusted Compu-
ting Group [42]. The main functionality of TC is to allow someone else to verify that only authorized
code runs on a system using cryptography techniques to help enforce that. This authorization co-
vers initial booting and kernel and may also cover applications and various scripts. An important
remark is that TC does not protect against attacks that exploit security vulnerabilities introduced
by programming bugs. The main component for trusted computing is the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) [43] that consists in a chip that ensures two basic functions [31]:
• Secure encryption keys storage: store encryption keys that are critical for some operations
like computer or device identification or even secure storage for short term encryption keys.
• Integrity system attestation: attest if the software running at the computer corresponds to
what is being expected to run.
The TPM has in its architecture five functional modules [44]:
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• Random number generator: Because randomness is critical in a cryptographic system this
module is used to generate cryptographic keys inside the TPM and also random numbers for
applications that are external to TPM.
• RSA key generator: This module generates keys for RSA operations. In order to derive the
keys it uses the output from the random number generator.
• RSA engine: A module that performs RSA encryption and decryption operations.
• Hash module: In this module are performed hash operations.
• HMAC module: Module that performs message code authentication operations.
The TPM also comprises a non-volatile memory where is stored important information [44] however
for the scope of this work we are interested in:
• Endorsement key: The endorsement key is a RSA public and private key pair, created ran-
domly on the chip at manufacture time and cannot be changed. This private key never leaves
the chip, while the public key is used for attestation and for encryption of sensitive data sent
to the chip.
• Storage Root Key: this is also a RSA public and private key pair, however these keys are
not present at initial time, they can be generated by the owner of the TPM. The private key
cannot leave the TPM and the pair is usually used to encrypt others private keys for being
stored outside the TPM.
The volatile memory stores a set of informations [44], but for the scope of this work we are interested
in:
• Temporary RSA keys.
• Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) to store the hash of the software modules keeping
the track of software measurements reported to TPM.
The TPM in the scope of the Trusted Computing has two main applications, which are [31]:
• System Integrity verification: At computer boot time the TPM measures the system’s data
integrity status. The measurement starts from the integrity of BIOS, then Boot Loader and OS,
and finally to applications. Thereby is possible to establish a desired computing environment
by loading only well behaved systems or applications which usually is called a ‘secure boot’
process. It is also permited a weaker measured boot which is called ‘authenticated boot’,
which means that it allows code loading that does not pass the measurement, however it will
only securely record the status of what has passed the measurement for attestation purpose.
• Remote platform attestation: Using cryptographic challenge-response mechanisms, a re-
mote entity can verify whether a computing system has the desired behavior. Therefore re-
mote attestation allows computer changes to be detected by authorized parties. To achieve
87
this the hardware of the trusted platform generates a certificate stating what software is cur-
rently running. This way the computer can present this certificate to a remote party to show
that unaltered software is currently executing. Since this technique is usually combined with
public key encryption the information can only be read by authorized parties and not by ea-
vesdropper. The remote attestation process can be summarized in the following picture:
Figure 5.1: Remote Attestation Process
5.3 Public Key Infrastructure
Some of the vulnerabilities that we highlighted in the previous chapter lead to situations where
either customer or service provider might experiment financial losses or other types of damages
resulting from a service failure. Most of the situations are derived from exploring vulnerabilities in
the data flows between information systems, distributions transformer controllers and energy boxes.
Therefore, based on the security analysis done in previous chapter, the scale of the system and
the required availability, we need to provide a framework to support security properties such as
confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation.
We believe that the right approach to provide such framework to InovGrid will be through the adop-
tion of a public key infrastructure (PKI) [45]. However, to successfully implement these security
mechanisms, we must carefully plan the infrastructure as also the processes to manage it, consi-
dering all the architecture’s issues. The adoption of a public key infrastructure is the base on which
other applications, network security components and systems, will build their mechanisms of trust.
5.3.1 Public Key Infrastructure Framework
A public key infrastructure consists in a set of hardware, software, operational policies, people and
procedures needed to create, manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital certificates. The
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generation, distribution, and management of public keys and associated certificates usually is done
through a Certification Authorities (CAs) and the registration of the bind between certificates and
correspondent public keys are done by the Registration Authorities (RAs). The PKI framework
permits the implementation of digital certificates that can be used to identify different entities and
establish a hierarchy or chain of trust. It also enable and support the secured exchange of data and
credentials in various environments that are typically insecure, such as the Internet, where entities
are often unknown to each other and do not have sufficient trust to established connection between
them.
5.3.1.1 Trusted Models in a PKI
When implementing a PKI it is necessary to perform an analysis in how to establish relationships in
the existent environment. The way those relationships are defined will establish a trust model that
the PKI enforces. We present now three different models for comparison [46].
Hierarchical, The most common trust model that we might find in PKI implementations is the
hierarchical. This hierarchical context allows an endpoint certificate to be signed by only one CA, as
long as this CA has another sign certificate from other CA above, forming a chain of CAs arranged
on a pre-established set of rules. In this situation we have a root CA that is the anchor point for all
issued certificates.
When establishing a hierarchical model we must consider that the administrative effort is bigger for
vertical models than if we chose a flat one, however in the last situation a failure in a single CA will
potential corrupt the entire trust model and probably all certificates signed by it.
Distributed, In a distributed model there is no CA to issues certificates. The all idea in this
model is to let the end points determine the level of trust that will establish with other entities. This
approach is more flexible however does not scale well. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [47] uses this
type of trust model in email environments.
Direct (Peer to Peer), This model of trust is similar to the distributed, however here an entity
establishes trust with every other entities. This scheme are used with secret or symmetric key-
based systems and requires a big effort to manage securely this peer to peer relationship, thus, not
scale well.
5.3.1.2 Public Key Infrastructure logical components
A public key infrastructure is composed of several components that include people, processes,
policies, protocols, hardware and software all together to manage public key certificates. This
section intents to describe some of the relevant components.
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Certificate Authority. This component is one of the most important component to provide trust
in all public key infrastructure since this component should be trusted by one or more users or
resources to provide key management services. A CA certifies the identity of an end entity by
generating and signing a message (certificate) with the entity’s identity and public key. It is important
to remark that the acceptance of a CA depends with its policies, technical issues and procedures.
In a hierarchical trusted model if the CA is at the top of trust hierarchy, then it has no upstream CA to
issue a certificate. In this situation the CA must distribute its public keys as self-signed certificates
and it is up to other entities to trust in this CA. The main functions of a CA are certificates generation
and revocation.
Registration Authorities. The Registration Authority (RA), although optional, exists in the majo-
rity of PKI installations and its purpose is to perform administrative tasks that a CA would usually
undertake. The RA works behind the CA to verify if an end entity’s identity is entitled to have a
issued public key certificate, usually by examining the name, dates validity and other related infor-
mation. The RA should enforce all policies and procedures defined in the infrastructure.
End Entity. The end entity can be a user or a resource such a computer that needs a digital
certificate in order to be identified for some reason. An important consideration is that the end
entity must have capacity to generate a public/private key pair and also to secure store and use its
private key.
Certificate Policy. The certificate policy establishes what are the different actors, their roles and
duties. A certificate policy is usually applicable to a particular group with a common security requi-
rements, it includes:
• Architecture for the PKI.
• Certificate uses describe the authorized and prohibited cases for certificate uses.
• Names, identification and authentication are also described in the certificate policy, namely
how are certificates names to be chosen and the associated needs for identification and
authentication.
• Key generation is also other aspect included in the certificate policy, it may also include rules
to prohibit user-generated keys and provide a more secure way of generating the keys.
Certificate Practices Statement. The Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) should publish the
policy statement details, in particular the practices that a CA enforces when issuing public key
certificates. These practices are not only operational but also procedural, with details about gene-
ration, management, storage, deployment and revocation of certificates. The main objective for this
practice statement is to promote trust in the public key infrastructure.
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5.3.1.3 Certificates Validation and Revocation
Public key certificates are issued for a fixed period of time however we might find situations where
they are no longer trustworthy and thus must be prematurely expired. This situation is known as
certificate revocation. Scenarios where private keys could be compromised or a certain device is
no longer trustworthy because someone detected that it was running malicious code, could lead
to a certification revocation situation. Certificate revocation must be initiated by the CA and the
usual mechanism to implement it is known as a Certificate Revocation List (CRL). A CRL is a list
generated by the CA that contains information about the revoked certificates which enables relying
entities to verify if a certificate is valid or not. To be secure a CRL should be time-stamped and
signed by the CA and is normally the relying entity’s to have the responsibility to retrieve the CRL.
There are many flavors of the CRL such segmented-CRLs or delta-CRLs [48]. However CRLs
are common used they have some issues, like the need to be published for everybody, the delays
resulting from time granularity CRLs update schemes or the need to have the CRL list allways
available and accessible for end entities. In fact the necessity of accessing a CRL prior to accepting
a certificate could lead to a denial-of-service attack against the PKI, where no operations depending
upon certificate acceptance can take place.
To avoid some of the problems associated with CRLs a Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
[49] has been developed which enables end entities to determine the revocation state of an iden-
tified certificate. This protocol provides more timely revocation information than it is possible with
CRLs. In this scenario a OCSP client issues a status request to an OCSP server and suspends
acceptance of the certificate until obtains a response.
Although OCSP has several advantages over CRLs, it might introduce a significant degradation for
CA who are now required to provide responses to every client of a given certificate in real time,
which can result in enormous volumes of traffic, and it also does not solve the availability problem,
which might lead to situations where devices operations are suspended due to the lack of access
to the OCSP server.
To overcome the availability problem the OCSP has a slight variant called OCSP Stapling [50]. In
the OCSP Stapling scenario the certificate owner queries the OCSP server at regular intervals,
obtaining a signed time-stamped response. This OCSP response also includes a nonce to avoid
replay attacks. Therefore a network node can obtain certificate status assertions periodically (when
they access the OSCP server) and use them later when authenticating with another node. With
this approach, regularly, the node would present its certificate status assertion together with its
certificate when performing authentication.
5.3.2 Public Key Infrastructure in InovGrid
We believe that the most effective solution to provide security to InovGrid will be based in a public
key infrastructure where we can build authentication, integrity and confidentiality mechanisms. In
the next sections we will describe some aspects for a public key infrastructure for InovGrid. The
contents of the next sections, together, comprises all we need to establish part of the InovGrid’s
Certificate Practice Statement.
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5.3.2.1 Trust Model
We propose a hierarchical trust model with a root of trust being provided by the electricity regulatory
entity and each operator having their own certification authority. We consider the hierarchical model
the best approach because the InovGrid’s architecture itself obeys to a hierarchical typology where
the communications flows between devices are mainly vertical and fixed over time (for instance we
do not have scenarios where energy boxes communicate between themselves). We also consider
that the root of trust should not belong to any operator, rather it should be hold by the regulatory
entity that should generate signed certificates for each operator.
The next picture shows the architecture that we propose for InovGrid’s public key infrastructure.
Figure 5.2: PKI Trust Model for InovGrid
The certificates shown in the picture that compose the proposed PKI infrastructure are identified as
InovGrid certificates. These certificates are issued by the operators’ CA and obeys to a procedure
explained later in this work, when describing security operations. We also consider for the InovGrid
infrastructure that is not necessary to maintain RA entities, thus we are assuming that the CA will
handle all the certificate’s management functions.
5.3.2.2 Certificate Validation
Considering that the InovGrid infrastructure is a critical infrastructure where the availability of all ar-
chitectural components is an important aspect as also the remain security properties, we propose
the use of OCSP Stapling protocol for certificate validation. This protocol is suitable in environments
like InovGrid, where we have availability constrains due to architecture issues like poor communi-
cation links, and also provides a more reliable mechanism to report about all tampered devices
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whose certificates must be invalidated. Since in this approach the end entities request certificates
status do the OCSP server, we consider that the best approach is to have another server than the
CA to perform this function, in order to not load too much the CA.
5.3.2.3 Certificate Revocation
In this section we establish the conditions under which a certificate may or must be revoked. A
certificate shall be revoked if:
• The private key of the certificate has been compromised.
• The certificate of the device/system has been modified.
• The device that owns a certificate has been compromised (somehow has been detected that
it was tampered).
• The device that owns a certificate is running malicious code (latter we provide a mechanism
to perform software attestation).
• The manufacturer from a device already working in the InovGrid’s infrastructure has become
not trustable, so it might be a option to revoke some certificates from their devices.
5.4 Security Operations
In this section we provide an overall diagram with all relevant entities for the security architecture
that we propose and also the operations guidelines to manage the infrastructure.
5.4.1 Overall Security Architecture
The next picture shows the elements that compose the proposed security architecture for the Inov-
Grid.
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Figure 5.3: InovGrid Security Architecture
Their functions are:
• InovGrid CA. The certification authority for a power electrical operator. The main function
from this component is to provide InovGrid certificates for new components in the network.
• InovGrid Certificate. Certificate provided by the InovGrid CA to new devices, users or ap-
plications that will integrate the InovGrid infrastructure. Entities will derive shared keys and
perform authentication in communication between them using InovGrid certificates.
• Manufacturer Certificate. This certificate can be for the EB, DTC or IS and corresponds to
the certificate preloaded by the manufacturer. The public key from this certificate must be pre
loaded at InovGrid CA, which means that the operator needs to trust in the manufacturer.
• Remote Attestation Verifier (RAV). This entity will perform remote attestation to software
that runs in InovGrid devices (e.g. EB). It will request to devices’ TPMs the running software
checksum value and compares it with the values stored at the configuration repository. If it
finds a device running a tampered software then it updates the state at the OCSP server.
• OCSP Server. This entity is responsible to hold and update all the certificates states and also
to give certificate status assertions to end entities when requested for it.
• Configuration Repository. All the information related with software configuration that should
be run at devices is stored in this repository. The remote attestation verifier will check if the
values it receives from the devices’ TPMs match the values stored in the repository. If it
matches then ok, otherwise the OCSP server must be informed.
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5.4.2 Assumptions
For our security model we make several assumptions:
• The devices or computers (IS, DTC, EB) have tamper proof hardware security modules so
that no one can retrieve the private keys that they store.
• The CAs, OCSP and the RAV servers are always available and they cannot be compromised.
It means that we assume that the root of trust cannot be compromised. Important to notice
that this assumption includes trust in the manufacturer’s root CA.
• Configuration repositories for software checksums are trusted and reliable.
• We consider the software that is loaded, ran and measured by the TPM in each device has
no vulnerabilities.
• We assume that the devices have good entropy sources in order to provide randomness and
strong keys for encryption.
5.4.3 Certificates Operational Procedures
5.4.3.1 Obtaining a InovGrid Certificate
Each device (e.g. EB or DTC) that is acquired for the InovGrid environment must have preloaded a
device certificate, signed by the manufacturer’s trusted root CA. The correspondent key pair for this
certificate is the endorsement key from the device trusted hardware platform. The public key from
the manufacturers trusted root CA must be loaded in the certification authorities from the network
operators, thus trust in the manufacturer is essential for our model.
When a InovGrid device (e.g. EB or DTC) is installed in the network for the first time it should
communicate directly with one of the CAs that will be handle certificate services for a given ope-
rator (either by GPRS or considering moving to the same premises). The end point device (e.g.
EB) now generates a new private and public key pair (root key) and sends a certificate signing re-
quest to the network operator CA, signed with its endorsement private key, together with the device
manufacturer certificate (that is signed by the manufacturer root CA, which the network operator
trusts because it has preloaded its public key). Therefore the operator’s CA now issues a InovGrid
certificate for the device that is ready to be installed in the network. The end point device stores
the root private key for the InovGrid certificate in its TPM which never leaves it. The procedure is
depicted in the following figure:
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Figure 5.4: Obtaining a InovGrid Certificate
When the operator’s CA issues a InovGrid certificate it also sends the CA certificate in order for the
device to recognize others InovGrid certificates from others end entities. This means that a device
that will be installed in InovGrid infrastructure shall trust in operator’s CA (that is why we assume
that this CA is trustable and reliable). It is also important to notice that we include a nonce in the
messages exchange to avoid replay attacks.
5.4.3.2 Certificate Validation
For certificate revocation and validation, due to availability constrains we have chosen the OCSP
Stapling because is more flexible and does not need the devices to connect directly to OCSP server
when authenticating each others. The InovGrid certificates might have a long date for expiration,
however since some devices might get compromised it is necessary to assure:
• OCSP server to maintain an updated list for certificates states.
• Periodically the devices should request the OCSP server for certificate status assertions that
should have themselves a time validity.
• End entities to request periodically, whit whom they communicate, the certificate status as-
sertions.
The OCSP server is updated by the remote device attestation process explained latter in this chap-
ter or by any infrastructure administration activity. Any time that a device is detected as tampered,
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the OCSP server will be updated by the entity that performs the attestation. Thereby, latter, when
the tampered device tries to obtain a new certificate status assertion, the OCSP server denies
the request, causing the situation where the device has no certificate status assertion to provide
to other entity when requested for it. Obviously that the time validity provided in each assertion
response dictates the risk of a compromised device to continue to use a previous certificate sta-
tus assertion when performing authentication operations. A compromised device might continue to
have activity in the network till its certificate status assertion expires and it is requested to provide
a new one.
To obtain a certification assertion a device must perform the steps depicted in following picture:
Figure 5.5: Obtain an OCSP Assertion
The time validity for a OCSP assertion should be a balance between the risk to have a compro-
mised device causing damages during a defined maximum period of time and the burden to have
6 million devices asking for OCSP assertions every day, for instance. Due to expected constrains
in some architecture layers, especially regarding communications to EBs, we propose one week
time validity for OCSP assertions, which means that a compromised device might use its previous
OCSP assertation at most 7 days. Obviously this value should be tuned (reduced if possible) af-
ter practical implementation. Any device should store the assertion validity of each others devices
whom they communicate and asks for a new assertion after the time has expired.
5.4.4 Confidentiality
We propose that all messages exchanged in the InovGrid architecture should be protected for
confidentiality. Vulnerabilities considering the disclosure of information can lead an attacker to learn
how the service provider operates the network and plan more advanced attacks. Also in a different
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scenario, an attacker might disclose out of time information related with the quality of service that
could impact in companies’ public image. There are however cases where only confidentiality is
not enough and we also need the messages to be protected against repudiation, those cases are
discussed in the next section.
In order to establish confidentiality we propose that devices use symmetric keys and algorithms to
encrypt and decrypt messages (because it is more efficient) but to use public key cryptography to
establish the shared key. We consider that the best solution is to create, on a daily base, a different
shared key by running the Diffie-Hellman algorithm [51]. We think that Diffie-Hellman is the best
approach because it is a secure algorithm that is not too much demanding in terms of computation
power, which is an important aspect considering that we have devices that are limited in processing
capabilities. To protect from man in middle attacks we propose that Diffie-Helman public numbers
should be signed by each party with their InovGrid keys, thereby, it is assumed that two parties
that communicate know each other’s public keys, which can be achieved by initially sending its
certificates together with the message. This process is often called Signed Diffie-Hellman (SDH)
[51]. The following picture shows the messages to derive the shared key.
Figure 5.6: Generating a Shared Key Using Signed Diffie-Hellman Algorithm
Once both parties agree on a shared key they should start encrypting their messages with a sym-
metric algorithm. Due to the already mentioned architecture constrains we need a secure algorithm
that performs well on variety of hardware platforms. We think that the best choice is Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES) [52] with a 128 bit key. We have chosen this algorithm because it is the
most popular with proven results (resistant to attacks), that runs pretty well even in 8 bit smartcards.
The key size option is the one with fewer bits that is still consider highly secure for the next decades
[53].
5.4.5 Authentication and Non-Repudiation
For the type of messages where a device sends a command or a configuration to other device we
propose a one way authentication message. The example that we might provide to illustrate this
scenario is when a DTC send a cut off power command to an EB (see table 3.21), but there are
others like clock synchronization information or firmware update (see table 3.24). In this situation
the EB needs to be sure that the command comes from a legitimate origin, thus it can trust and
process the information received. The information exchange is authenticated and also encrypted
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with a shared key derived from Diffie-Hellman protocol. The following picture depicts the one way
authentication message exchange.
Figure 5.7: One Way Authentication Messages
We propose a two way authentication between architecture elements for request/answer messages
that retrieve billing information from devices (see table 3.20), as an example the DTC requesting
power figures from the EB and in consequence the EB’s responses. The authentication procedure
make use of public key signatures, thereby is assumed that two parties that communicate know
each other’s public keys which can be achieved by initially sending its certificates together with the
message.
Figure 5.8: Two Way Authentication Messages
As in the one way authentication the messages should include a nonce to avoid replay attacks
and a timestamp to allow implement message expiration due to delay. The two way authentication
messages that we propose in the picture is suitable for information that must be protected from
repudiation and also from unauthorized disclosure. The messages exchanged in this scenario
could be stored and used as proof that indeed the operations were requested and power figures
were sent. There are other situations where we can relax the non-repudiation requirements and
maintain only the confidentiality of message contents, as we have described in the previous section.
5.4.6 Remote Device Attestation
For the InovGrid security architecture we purpose that the remote attestation verifier could remotely
attest what other devices (e.g. EB or DTC) are running. To implement such feature there must be
a central repository that stores the cryptographic checksum for the software that should be running
in the EBs and DTCs. It is also required that each device should securely store a cryptographic
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checksum (or hash) of the specific executables that ran in a session since the platform was booted.
The devices store this information in PCR registers at the TPM.
Every time the remote attestation verifier fails to attest a device it should updates the OCSP server
list by adding to the revocation list the certificate for that equipment. An important aspect is that
will exists many versions of firmware or software that should be consider valid, thus is essential
to maintain updated the repository for the valid checksums. In order to maintain the integrity and
confidentiality of the process each device has Attestation ID Keys (AIKs) which can sign PCRs.
Therefore, a digitally signed PCR value together with a nonce to avoid replay attacks, which is
verifiable upon a challenge by a third party using a public AIK, provides an assertion that a device
is running the specific executable. A final remark to notice that the AIKs are provided by the InovGrid
certificate, which was generated initially when the device was installed in the grid.
The following picture depicts what we purpose for remote device attestation at InovGrid:
Figure 5.9: Remote Attestation at InovGrid
5.5 Discussion
For the proposed security architecture to InovGrid we have made several assumptions. We now
discuss those assumptions and how we could, if possible, relax some of them.
We have as assumption that the CAs cannot be compromised because the certificates root of trust
will also be compromised. To weaken the coverage of our model we might consider use intrusion
tolerance techniques for the CAs [54]. Therefore we might assume that some CAs could be com-
promised and still provide a root of trust to users and devices in InovGrid. For the configuration
checksums repository, which we also assumed that could not be compromised, we propose the
use of intrusion tolerant repository techniques [55] in order to support a pre-defined intrusion level
without compromising the contents.
Considering all the applications that run at information systems layer, DTC and EB, we assume in
our module that they do not have code vulnerabilities. To weaken the coverage of our model we
should ensure that the applications development follows secure software security methodologies,
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which includes static and dynamic code analysis as well intrusion testing. We might also consider
different vendors or developments for the same software requirements in order to avoid common
faults, however this might be unfeasible since will raise the costs of the infrastructure.
Considering the trust that our security architecture proposal need to have in manufacturer’s cer-
tificates, the only thing that we might comment is that manufacturers should be wisely selected
and should present secure methodologies and practices that goes beyond technical skills, but also
human resources policies.
We have assumed that devices will perform some cryptographic operations like RSA signatures
which require some computational power. We have enforced the use of RSA algorithm because
the current TPMs available in the market are designed to perform RSA operations in a very efficient
way, thus, even considering a limited computing power, we believe that RSA operations (the ones
that costs more) could be performed by all the architecture components.
Finally we consider in our assumptions that the devices should have a TPM. We might ask if such
requirement will drive up costs for price sensitive InovGrid devices. We consider that nowadays the
smartcard market is driving down the price of chips that can securely store keys and also perform
public key operations, so we believe that when acquired in large quantities the prices will get even
lower.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Conclusion
What we are about to assist is a paradigm shift in electrical power industry and the changes are
so many that is hard to foresee what the future holds. There are however some certainties and
one is that we are introducing new vulnerabilities and also that we will face serious cyber security
problems that should be addressed properly. The smart grids will be the evolution of current power
grid critical infrastructures but they will assume a bigger impact in our lives than the current power
grid. This bigger impact results not only because smart grids will control and support the needs
of the future energy objectives for sustainability but also because they will be more exposed and
vulnerable to nowadays threats like cyber terrorism, financial crime or natural disasters.
Assuming such importance, smart grid’s infrastructure requires the highest levels of security and
a comprehensive architecture that shall embodies defense in depth strategy. Security in the smart
grids should be thought at several architecture layers without loosing the holistic view. It also
should not focus only on security technical aspects but must embrace organizations processes and
activities like service and product acquisition or human resources training. Furthermore security
should be included since the beginning and the security mechanisms implemented should be ca-
reful thought in order to reduce vulnerabilities risk to an acceptable level, because decisions made
now will affect the electrical power grid for decades to come.
This work has done an analysis of the new vulnerabilities introduced by the smart grids and also
the difficulties to adopt security mechanisms due to the heterogeneity of the architecture. It also
has presented a prototype implementation of the Portuguese project, InovGrid. We have described
the architecture and requirements and also made a security analysis in order to understand the
impacts and find security mechanisms to mitigate the risk. We have proposed a security archi-
tecture focused in providing support for integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation problems. We
believe that the best approach for that security architecture is to adopt a public key infrastructure
combined with trusted computing techniques. We are conscious that our propose does not solve
all the security issues for such complex problem, however we consider that we have demonstrated
that will be the base where other security solutions will growth.
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6.2 Future Work
Security in smart grids is a very wide space for research and learning. The security of these net-
works has so many variables, different requirements and technologies that is impossible to address
all the problems in a single research project. For future work we have identified some venues for
research that we consider most important for the overall security.
In first place we consider that the energy box needs to be studied in detail. This equipment, due to
the large number that will exists in the architecture and also because it will be installed at customer
installations, is a critical point that, for sure, will be attacked by malicious individuals. So we think
that would be useful to deeply test the security of the energy box, starting for physical tampering
resistance testing to the software security, through all other aspects like security of communications
or log generation and retention.
Another important theme that we would consider as a research project is the security of communi-
cations in smart grids. Since nowadays we assist a push to use COTS (commercial off-the-shelf)
like public networks, cloud computing, Internet or enterprise systems, we need to research if those
resources can be used in these new networks in a reliable and secure way and how they should
be implemented. As an example, in case of clouds, where service depends on the Internet which
is a place where malicious activity takes place, we need to consider the cloud services provider as
also the smart grid requirements and understand what, from smart grids architecture, can be used
in the cloud resource and also what are the risks we are exposed and how to mitigate them.
At the current time the InovGrid project is defining new requirements to make the architecture evo-
lutes to a more resilient power grid, planning the inclusion of new architecture component to control
different medium voltage installed devices as also all DTC installed at switch substations. This
evolution embodies the smart grid’s objectives and represents and evolution in network operation,
since it will permit to interact with medium voltage network elements, providing a bigger number of
control variables. Therefore this device will allow the use of advanced network management algo-
rithms which lead to a more coordinate and efficient network operation. As an example this medium
voltage control devices allows to detect and locate electrical faults and reconfigure the electrical
network to restore the service without the intervention of SCADA systems. This way we achieve
a better quality by reducing the time to restore the service. The distribution transformer controller
will permit the installation of a voltage control coordinate system and manage simultaneous several
microgrids downstream to the DTCs. Extend the attack model study and requirements in a new
architecture context will also constitutes an interesting vector for future work.
Finally, this work has proposed a security architecture but it will be essential to test and tune the
solutions described in our work. It is essential to understand in practice if is feasible to have TPM
in each device or to symmetric encrypt all the messages exchanged, not to mention the PKI ad-
ministration activity with a single CA. We consider that develop a simulation environment, with all
architectural constraints, where we can test the solutions we are proposing, and that we believe are
essential, will also be an excellent venue for future work.
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